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Will LGBT Antidiscrimination Law Follow 
the Course of Race Antidiscrimination 
Law? 
Robert S. Chang† 
  INTRODUCTION   
On June 26, 2015, the United States Supreme Court in 
Obergefell v. Hodges made marriage equality the law of the 
land.1 In this ruling, the Court burnished its reputation as an 
institution that safeguards civil rights for all.2 Consider the 
Court’s opening line in Obergefell: “The Constitution promises 
liberty to all within its reach, a liberty that includes certain 
specific rights that allows persons, within a lawful realm, to de-
fine and express their identity.”3 In closing, the Court says of 
the petitioners who sought marriage equality: “They ask for 
equal dignity in the eyes of the law. The Constitution grants 
them that right.”4 The Court also makes clear that the Consti-
tution is not self-executing and that the Court is the ultimate 
arbiter that safeguards the civil rights guaranteed by the Con-
stitution, even, and perhaps especially, when the democratic 
process would say otherwise.5 
 
†  Professor of Law and Executive Director, Fred T. Korematsu Center 
for Law and Equality, Seattle University School of Law. I’d like to thank Rajin 
Olson of the Minnesota Law Review for inviting me to participate in the Law 
Review’s Centennial Symposium. I’d also like to thank the participants in Se-
attle University School of Law’s Summer Workshop Series for comments on an 
earlier draft. Copyright © 2016 by Robert S. Chang. 
 1. See 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604–05 (2015). 
 2. See, e.g., David H. Gans, A Term to Remember, NEW REPUBLIC (June 
28, 2015), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/122191/supreme-court-term 
-remember (“Defying the view that it’s entirely hostile to civil rights, the Court 
ruled [this term] time and again for the protection of equality.”). 
 3. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2593. 
 4. Id. at 2608. 
 5. Id. at 2605 (discussing the importance of the democratic process but 
noting that “when the rights of persons are violated, ‘the Constitution requires 
redress by the courts,’ notwithstanding the more general value of democratic 
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While some were celebrating the outcome, others wondered 
what would come next.6 Would there be acquiescence or re-
sistance to the ruling? In a short span of time, we saw the im-
ages of same-sex couples celebrating their legal marriages jux-
taposed against Texas Governor Greg Abbott and Louisiana 
Governor Bobby Jindal vowing to fight the Supreme Court rul-
ing;7 Chief Justice Roy Moore of the Alabama Supreme Court 
directing local officials to deny marriage licenses to same-sex 
couples;8 a Kentucky clerk refusing to issue any marriage li-
censes to any couples, gay or straight;9 and vendors refusing to 
provide services for same-sex weddings.10 Were these defiant 
acts the harbinger of massive resistance hearkening back to the 
aftermath of Brown v. Board of Education (Brown I)11 that 
backlash prognosticators predicted?12 Backlash prognosticators 
 
decisionmaking” (quoting Schuette v. BAMN, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1637 (2014))). 
 6. See, e.g., Symposium, After Marriage, 42 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 479 
(2015); Robert P. Jones, After Same-Sex Marriage, Then What?, ATLANTIC 
(June 24, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/06/after 
-same-sex-marriage-then-what/396659. 
 7. Nicole Hensley, Louisiana, Texas Governors Vow to Fight Supreme 
Court Ruling on Gay Marriage While Others Pledge to Comply, N.Y. DAILY 
NEWS (June 26, 2015, 5:09 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/ 
governors-vow-disobey-scotus-ruling-gay-marriage-article-1.2272503. 
 8. Administrative Order of the Chief Justice of the Alabama Supreme 
Court (Feb. 8, 2015), http://www.scribd.com/doc/255138696/Moore-Order-to 
-Ala-Probate-Judges.  
 9. See Alan Blinder & Richard Pérez-Peña, Kentucky Clerk Denies Same-
Sex Marriage Licenses, Defying Court, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2015), http://www 
.nytimes.com/2015/09/02/us/same-sex-marriage-kentucky-kim-davis.html. 
 10. See, e.g., Paige Cornwell, Amid Indiana Controversy, Donations Soar 
for Washington Florist Who Refused Gay Wedding, SEATTLE TIMES (Apr. 4, 
2015, 1:12 PM), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/amid-indiana 
-controversy-donations-soar-for-washington-florist-who-refused-gay-wedding; 
Curtis M. Wong, Georgia Florists Say They Won’t Serve Gay Couples Even as 
State’s Religious Freedom Act Stalls, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 3, 2015, 4:19 
PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/04/03/georgia-florist-gay-wedding_ 
n_7001288.html (discussing Georgia florists as well as the Indiana pizzeria 
that refused to cater same-sex weddings). 
 11. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 12. Briefly, the backlash thesis is “the proposition that litigation does 
more harm than good for social change movements by producing 
countermobilization that makes reform goals more difficult to receive.” Scott 
L. Cummings & Douglas NeJaime, Lawyering for Marriage Equality, 57 
UCLA L. REV. 1235, 1237 (2010) (discussing the two scholars, Gerald Rosen-
berg and Michael Klarman, most closely associated with advancing this thesis 
with regard to marriage equality based on their analysis of what occurred af-
ter Brown). 
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were critical of the prospects for marriage equality litigation to 
bring about change.13 
Further, what other changes lie ahead for LGBT civil 
rights? Though same-sex adult couples can now get married 
and have their marriages recognized in every state, they can 
still be fired from their jobs in twenty-nine states for being 
gay,14 and in many states can be discriminated against with re-
gard to housing and public accommodations.15 Liberty and 
equality seem a long way off. One commentator notes that 
“[t]he pioneering states that first extended marriage rights to 
same-sex couples did so only after they had first enacted work-
place nondiscrimination laws.”16 In pronouncing marriage 
equality, did the Court get ahead of itself?  
Only time will tell what course LGBT civil rights will take, 
with many struggles to come in federal and state legislative 
and administrative arenas, and of course in the courts. How 
will LGBT antidiscrimination law develop? The relevant canon 
of Supreme Court jurisprudence on this issue is pretty thin, 
with Obergefell joining Romer v. Evans,17 Lawrence v. Texas,18 
 
 13. See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, Brown and Lawrence (and Goodridge), 
104 MICH. L. REV. 431, 459–73 (2005) (detailing the negative consequences for 
same-sex marriage following Lawrence); Gerald N. Rosenberg, Courting Disas-
ter: Looking for Change in All the Wrong Places, 54 DRAKE L. REV. 795, 813–14 
(2006) (“Litigation substitutes symbols for substance. . . . Without political 
support, court decisions will not produce social change.”). As the tide shifted, 
Klarman has walked back his backlash prediction. See Michael J. Klarman, 
Windsor and Brown: Marriage Equality and Racial Equality, 127 HARV. L. 
REV. 127, 148 (2013) (“[W]e have no way of knowing whether a broad constitu-
tional ruling in favor of gay marriage would have generated political backlash 
on the same scale that Brown and Roe did. Yet there is reason to believe that 
it would not have.”). 
 14. Kevin Short, The 29 States Where You Can Still Be Fired for Being 
Gay, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 30, 2014, 3:43 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost 
.com/2014/10/30/fired-for-being-gay_n_6076492.html. For more detailed infor-
mation about state non-discrimination laws, see Non-Discrimination Laws: 
State by State Information—Map, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/map/non 
-discrimination-laws-state-state-information-map (last visited Mar. 31, 2016). 
 15. See Erik Eckholm, Next Fight for Gay Rights: Bias in Jobs and Hous-
ing, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/28/us/gay 
-rights-leaders-push-for-federal-civil-rights-protections.html. 
 16. Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Marriage Equality, Workplace Inequali-
ty: The Next Gay Rights Battle, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1099, 1115 (2015). 
 17. 517 U.S. 620, 624 (1996) (finding unconstitutional a state constitu-
tional amendment that prevented state and local governments from enacting, 
adopting, or enforcing “any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby 
homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relation-
ships shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of or entitle any person or class 
of persons to have or claim any minority status, quota preferences, protected 
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and United States v. Windsor.19 Will advances for LGBT indi-
viduals and communities occur notwithstanding the ongoing re-
trenchment of rights for racial minorities as well as the 
maintenance of racially disparate outcomes for certain racial 
minorities, leading to further division and stratification?20 Will 
the Supreme Court’s LGBT jurisprudence follow a course simi-
lar to the Court’s race jurisprudence?21  
This Article takes up these questions, drawing from Alan 
David Freeman’s groundbreaking article, Legitimizing Racial 
Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical 
Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, in which he claims that not 
only did federal antidiscrimination law develop in a way that 
failed to redress racial inequality but, moreover, served to legit-
imize racial discrimination.22 Part I is descriptive and sets forth 
the Freeman hypothesis in greater detail and reviews his peri-
odization of Supreme Court race cases. Freeman, in a later ar-
ticle, revisited this topic and examined cases through 1989. 
Part I extends the analysis to review Supreme Court race cases 
since 1989 to see if the Freeman hypothesis still holds.23 Draw-
 
status or claim of discrimination”). 
 18. 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 
(1986), and finding a liberty interest in the Due Process Clause under which 
“[t]he State cannot demean . . . [the] existence [of] [two adults, who with full 
and mutual consent from each other, engaged in sexual practices common to a 
homosexual lifestyle] or control their destiny by making their private sexual 
conduct a crime”). 
 19. 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013) (finding unconstitutional the Defense of 
Marriage Act which defined marriage as applying only to heterosexual un-
ions). I do not include Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2668 (2013), the 
case involving a constitutional challenge to California’s Proposition 22, that 
had defined marriage as the union between one man and one woman, since a 
5–4 majority of the Court did not reach the merits of the challenge because it 
found that the petitioners in Hollingsworth lacked standing. 
 20. See infra Part II.A. 
 21. See infra Part I and Part II.B.  
 22. Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through 
Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 
MINN. L. REV. 1049 (1978) [hereinafter Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrim-
ination]. 
 23. Professor Freeman revisited his thesis approximately a decade later in 
Alan Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law: The View from 1989, 64 TUL. L. REV. 
1407 (1990) [hereinafter Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law]. He passed away 
in 1996 so we do not have the benefit of his characterization and critique of the 
Court’s post-1989 race jurisprudence. A moving set of remembrances of him as 
a teacher, scholar, and human being can be found in the Buffalo Law Review. 
See Colloquy, A Gathering to Remember Alan Freeman, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 613 
(1996) (featuring contributions by Barry B. Boyer, Peter Gabel, Anthony 
Kronman, Thomas E. Headrick, Sara Nichols, Bill Magavern, Al Katz, Thomas 
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ing from Freeman’s periodization and the course of race anti-
discrimination law, Part II is conjectural and speculates on the 
course of antidiscrimination law as it relates to LGBT civil 
rights. It argues that Freeman’s hypothesis will likely hold true 
for LGBT civil rights, though as with the course of race antidis-
crimination law, there will be twists and turns along the way. 
Part III is prescriptive and poses the “so what” question. If we 
accept Freeman’s hypothesis as correct with regard to race an-
tidiscrimination law and predictive with regard to LGBT anti-
discrimination law, what ought we to do? The Article concludes 
by suggesting that we take up Freeman’s call to redirect our 
energy to other political institutions, including advocacy that 
more intentionally develops state antidiscrimination jurispru-
dence. 
I.  THE FREEMAN HYPOTHESIS—ANTIDISCRIMINATION 
LAW LEGITIMIZES RACIAL DISCRIMINATION   
In 1978, Alan David Freeman published Legitimizing Ra-
cial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Criti-
cal Review of Supreme Court Doctrine in the Minnesota Law 
Review.24 Though the article emerged from Freeman’s partici-
pation in Critical Legal Studies (CLS),25 the article bridges CLS 
and Critical Race Theory (CRT), playing a key role in both.26 
Given the article’s importance in CLS and CRT, it is no wonder 
that the Minnesota Law Review chose it as one of the articles to 
commemorate for its centennial celebration. In addition, 
though citation counts are an imperfect and incomplete meas-
 
Schofield, and John Henry Schlegel).  
 24. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination, supra note 22. 
 25. Freeman’s authorial footnote for Legitimizing Racial Discrimination 
thanks scholars from the Conference on Critical Legal Studies. See id. at 1049 
n.*. He self identifies as a CLS scholar and defends himself and CLS against 
the pieces that launch CRT. See Alan Freeman, Racism, Rights and the Quest 
for Equality of Opportunity: A Critical Legal Essay, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
295, 296 (1988) (responding to Symposium, Minority Critiques of the Critical 
Legal Studies Movement, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 297 (1987)). 
 26. For example, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination is included in one of 
the two initial CRT readers as one of the key writings that formed CRT. See 
CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT 
29–46 (Kimberlé Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995); cf. Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, 
The First Decade: Critical Reflections, or “A Foot in the Closing Door,” 49 
UCLA L. REV. 1343, 1363 n.22 (including Alan Freeman among “Anglo schol-
ars whose articles are key texts within CRT”). See generally Mario Barnes, 
“The More Things Change . . .”: New Moves for Legitimizing Racial Discrimi-
nation in a “Post-Race” World, 100 MINN. L. REV. 2043 (2016) (discussing the 
jurisprudential place of Freeman’s work). 
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ure of influence,27 this article was recognized in 1996 as being 
ranked 82nd on a list of the “Most-Cited Law Review Articles of 
All Time.”28 Since 1996, it has continued to garner scholarly at-
tention.29  
Freeman begins Legitimizing Racial Discrimination with 
the following observation: “[A]s surely as the law has outlawed 
racial discrimination, it has affirmed that Black Americans can 
be without jobs, have their children in all-black, poorly funded 
schools, have no opportunities for decent housing, and have 
very little political power, without any violation of antidiscrim-
ination law.”30 First, it is important to set forth what Freeman 
understood to constitute federal antidiscrimination law. He de-
fines it as “federal constitutional and statutory law, as ex-
pounded or interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, 
defining the conduct to be treated as racial discrimination.”31 
Freeman then reviews twenty-five years of Supreme Court doc-
trine to show how it came to be that Black inequality can exist 
and persist notwithstanding federal antidiscrimination law.32 
In addition to being “technical assertions of legal doctrine,” Su-
preme Court opinions “not only reflect dominant societal moral 
positions, but also serve as part of the process of forming or 
crystallizing such positions.”33 Because federal antidiscrimina-
tion law determines what is and is not discrimination, the fact 
that Black inequality exists and persists must occur for reasons 
 
 27. One should be careful, though, what conclusions one draws from cita-
tion counts. See Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Re-
view of Civil Rights Literature, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 561, 563 (1984) (comment-
ing on the lack of attention paid to the work of minority scholars writing in the 
area of antidiscrimination law, describing “an inner circle of about a dozen 
white, male writers who comment on, take polite issue with, extol, criticize, 
and expand on each other’s ideas”). 
 28. See Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles Revisited, 71 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 751, 767, 770 (1996) (based on citations in Social Sciences 
Citation Index from 1956 through May 1995).  
 29. The article’s influence and impact as measured by citations has con-
tinued, with 390 citations after May 1995 in WESTLAW LAW REVIEWS & JOUR-
NALS, https://a.next.westlaw.com/search/home.html (follow “Secondary 
Sources” hyperlink; then follow “Law Reviews & Journals” hyperlink; then 
search “(alan /2 freeman) /5 legitimizing & da(aft 5/31/1995)”) (search conduct-
ed Mar. 31, 2016). 
 30. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination, supra note 22, at 1050. 
 31. Id. at 1050 n.8. 
 32. Id. at 1057–118. 
 33. Id. at 1051 (footnote omitted).  
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other than discrimination.34 It is in this sense that Black ine-
quality is legitimized.  
The Court has created a crimped vision of what constitutes 
discrimination, such that federal antidiscrimination law, in ad-
dition to being ineffectual in redressing Black inequality, actu-
ally legitimizes racial discrimination by rationalizing inequality 
as not resulting from discrimination. For Freeman, antidis-
crimination law fits within a vision of law that “serves largely 
to legitimize the existing social structure,” though its operation 
must be sufficiently “credible for those whose allegiance it 
seeks as well as those whose self-interest it rationalizes.”35 In 
other words, in order for the Court to fulfill its legitimation 
function, we must continue to believe in the utility of antidis-
crimination law despite its ultimate and intended futility.36 An-
tidiscrimination law, then, contains within it a dangerous con-
tradiction. 
Further, this understanding of antidiscrimination law is 
not part of the standard civil rights narrative, which presumes 
a self-correcting mechanism that moves us steadily, though if 
at times inconsistently, toward racial equality. Instead, Free-
man’s analysis is consistent with Derrick Bell’s notion of inter-
est convergence as it operates in the context of civil rights.37 
 
 34. Freeman makes this point in the following hypothetical:  
Suppose one were to visit the future society of racial irrelevance and 
discover conditions that in any other society might be regarded as 
corresponding with a pattern of racial discrimination. Among such 
conditions might be that one race seems to have a hugely dispropor-
tionate share of the worse houses, the most demeaning jobs, and the 
least control over societal resources. For such conditions to be fair and 
accepted as legitimate by the disfavored race in future society, they 
would have to be perceived as produced by accidental, impartial, or 
neutral phenomena utterly dissociated from any racist practice. 
Id. at 1074–75. 
 35. Id. at 1051. 
 36. Cf. Guyora Binder, On Critical Legal Studies as Guerrilla Warfare, 76 
GEO. L.J. 1, 29 (1987). Binder, commenting on law’s legitimation function, 
notes:  
If the actors in American politics are directed by shared values rather 
than opposing interests, then it is conceivable that the political pro-
cess will transfer wealth and power from those with more to those 
with less. If the political process will lead to the empowerment of the 
weak and the enrichment of the poor, then the poor and weak have no 
need to use or threaten violence in order to achieve justice. 
Id. 
 37. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-
Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 524–25 (1980) (discussing the 
convergence of interests that led to Brown I). 
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Bell observed that advances for racial minorities tended to oc-
cur when they served the interests of those in society with pow-
er.38 Thus, one way to understand Brown v. Board of Education 
is that it came about not (merely) because of the immorality or 
illegality of segregation but because of the convergence of inter-
ests: “whites in policymaking positions able to see the economic 
and political advances at home and abroad that would follow 
abandonment of segregation” and “reassurance to American 
blacks that the precepts of equality and freedom so heralded 
during World War II might yet be given meaning at home.”39 
To help elucidate his hypothesis, Freeman uses the notion 
of perpetrator and victim perspectives. 
A. THE PERPETRATOR AND VICTIM PERSPECTIVES 
Freeman notes that there are different ways that one 
might understand racial discrimination and offers the victim 
and perpetrator perspectives as possibilities the Court could 
have followed. 
From the victim’s perspective, racial discrimination describes those 
conditions of actual social existence as a member of a perpetual un-
derclass. This perspective includes . . . the objective conditions of 
life—lack of jobs, lack of money, lack of housing . . . . The perpetrator 
perspective sees racial discrimination not as conditions, but as ac-
tions, or series of actions, inflicted on the victim by the perpetrator. 
The focus is more on what particular perpetrators have done or are 
doing to some victims than it is on the overall life situation of the vic-
tim class.40 
A clear tension exists between these perspectives and the 
possibilities for antidiscrimination law, depending on what per-
spective would dominate. If the victim’s perspective had become 
the animating force behind federal antidiscrimination law, we 
might find ourselves in a very different place, with different 
outcomes than what we see. Instead, the perpetrator perspec-
tive has won out, where racial discrimination takes “place in a 
 
 38. Bell observed: 
It follows that the availability of fourteenth amendment protection in 
racial cases may not actually be determined by the character of harm 
suffered by blacks or the quantum of liability proved against whites. 
Racial remedies may instead be the outward manifestations of unspo-
ken and perhaps subconscious judicial conclusions that the remedies, 
if granted, will secure, advance, or at least not harm societal interests 
deemed important by middle and upper class whites. 
Id. at 523. 
 39. Id. at 524–25. 
 40. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination, supra note 22, at 1052–
53 (footnotes omitted). 
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virtually ahistorical realm where atomistic individuals ‘inten-
tionally’ ‘cause’ harm to other individuals, in short, reducing 
the problem to one of tort.”41 These elements are constructed in 
such a way as to severely narrow what is legally recognized as 
discrimination. 
Though ultimately the perpetrator perspective would pre-
vail, post-Brown jurisprudence shows that this was not inevi-
table. What follows is a periodization of federal antidiscrimina-
tion law as described by Freeman up until 1989. The 
periodization from 1989 attempts to extend Freeman’s analysis 
to the present. A review of these cases shows antidiscrimina-
tion law’s dangerous contradiction. 
B. PERIODIZING FEDERAL ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW—RACE  
CASES 
1. 1954–1965: The Era of Uncertainty 
Brown I ushered in what Freeman describes as an era of 
uncertainty.42 Part of the uncertainty came from the lack of 
clarity with regard to the doctrinal basis for its ultimate con-
clusion that segregation in public schools constituted a viola-
tion of the Equal Protection Clause. There were critics like 
Herbert Wechsler43 and defenders like Charles Black.44 For 
Wechsler, who questioned the factual basis for segregation be-
ing harmful to blacks, assuming equal facilities as the Brown 
court did, the only doctrinal basis for the decision had to be 
based on the “denial by the state of freedom to associate.”45 The 
problem for Wechsler was that “if the freedom of association is 
denied by segregation, integration forces an association upon 
those for whom it is unpleasant or repugnant.”46 Thus, in the 
absence of a neutral constitutional principle, the Court in 
 
 41. Alan D. Freeman, Truth and Mystification in Legal Scholarship, 90 
YALE L.J. 1229, 1235 (1981). 
 42. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination, supra note 22, at 1057. 
 43. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 
73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 31–34 (1959) (criticizing the doctrinal basis of Brown, find-
ing no neutral constitutional principle upon which the decision could be 
based). 
 44. Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 
YALE L.J. 421, 424–28 (1960) (responding to Wechsler and finding racial 
equality to be the neutral constitutional principle supporting Brown I).  
 45. Wechsler, supra note 43, at 34. 
 46. Id. 
  
2112 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [100:2103 
 
Brown I essentially undertook a legislative function in deter-
mining whose associational interests would prevail. 
To this, Derrick Bell responds, “To doubt that racial segre-
gation is harmful to blacks, and to suggest that what blacks re-
ally sought was the right to associate with whites, is to believe 
in a world that does not exist now and could not possibly have 
existed then.”47 Wechsler’s approach is both ahistorical and 
acontextual, in some ways presaging techniques the Court 
would later use to contain and constrain what it had started in 
Brown I and in its development of antidiscrimination law. 
Charles Black, on the other hand, found the question as to 
whether segregation could constitute equal treatment within 
the historical context of the United States to be laughable.48 
Aside from the lack of doctrinal clarity, much of the uncer-
tainty about civil rights possibilities that might follow Brown I 
stemmed from the disjuncture between the constitutional viola-
tion and the remedy. Rather than striking down segregated 
public education and mandating integration, the Court re-
manded the cases to the lower courts the following year in 
Brown II: 
Full implementation . . . may require solution of varied local school 
problems. School authorities have the primary responsibility for elu-
cidating, assessing, and solving these problems; courts will have to 
consider whether the action of school authorities constitutes good 
faith implementation of the governing constitutional principles. Be-
cause of their proximity to local conditions and the possible need for 
further hearings, the courts which originally heard these cases can 
best perform this judicial appraisal.49 
With that, we were given the infamous direction given to 
the district courts “to take such proceedings and enter such or-
ders and decrees consistent with this opinion as are necessary 
and proper to admit to public schools on a racially nondiscrimi-
natory basis with all deliberate speed the parties to these cas-
es.”50  
Because the determination of any remedies required atten-
tion to the particular local conditions in each school district, 
remedies were limited to the parties in these cases. Students in 
school districts other than those directly involved in the cases 
consolidated in Brown I and II had to file their own lawsuits if 
they wanted a measure of relief under the constitutional prin-
 
 47. Bell, supra note 37, at 522.  
 48. Black, supra note 44, at 421. 
 49. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 299 (1955). 
 50. Id. at 301 (emphasis added). 
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ciples articulated in Brown I. We see in Brown I and II the 
Court giving voice to both the perpetrator and victim perspec-
tives. Though the condition of Blacks subjected to segregated 
education (victim’s perspective) provides the basis for the 
Court’s finding of constitutional violation, a remedy that would 
vindicate the victim’s perspective—the immediate outlawing of 
school segregation—is refused in Brown II and, instead, ag-
grieved parties must assert and prove their claim of constitu-
tional violation committed by a particular perpetrator and seek 
and enforce that remedy against that perpetrator.51  
Though Brown contained within it great promise, the 
Court’s doctrinal imprecision, failure to commit to a remedy, 
and limitation of the remedy to the parties in the original law-
suits makes this a period of uncertainty. 
2. 1965–1974: The Era of Contradiction 
In some ways, Freeman’s Era of Contradiction is ushered 
in, and perhaps necessitated, by the Civil Rights Act of 196452 
and the Voting Rights Act of 1965.53 With far-reaching legisla-
tion to reach what had been outside of constitutional purview 
as private discrimination or a matter for the states, the Court 
had to determine first whether the legislation was constitu-
tional and second what could be accomplished under the stat-
utes. 
When Congress had previously attempted to regulate pub-
lic accommodations in the Civil Rights Act of 1875, the Court, 
in the Civil Rights Cases, had found that Congress had over-
reached. Justice Bradley famously stated: 
When a man has emerged from slavery, and by the aid of beneficent 
legislation has shaken off the inseparable concomitants of that state, 
there must be some stage in the progress of his elevation when he 
takes the rank of a mere citizen, and ceases to be the special favorite 
of the laws . . . .54 
With that, Justice Bradley found unconstitutional the portions 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 that forbid discrimination on the 
basis of race with regard to access to public accommodations. 
He held that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited racially 
discriminatory state action but that the Fourteenth Amend-
 
 51. See discussion of desegregation cases infra Part I.B.2. 
 52. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a–2000a-6 (2012)). 
 53. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as 
amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10101 (2014)). 
 54. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883). 
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ment did not reach “[i]ndividual invasion of individual rights.”55 
Justice Bradley constructed a divide based on the public and 
the private, stating: 
The wrongful act of an individual, unsupported by any such [State] 
authority, is simply a private wrong, . . . but if not sanctioned in some 
way by the State, or not done under State authority, his rights remain 
in full force, and may presumably be vindicated by resort to the laws 
of the State for redress.56 
Because the first and second sections of the Civil Rights Act of 
1875 tried to regulate private conduct “not sanctioned in some 
way by the State, or not done under State authority,”57 there 
was no violation of the Fourteenth Amendment,58 and Congress 
exceeded its authority under the Thirteenth Amendment.59 
This time around, the Court would uphold the 1960s civil 
rights acts,60 but had the task of determining the doctrinal re-
quirements to establish violations and appropriate remedies. 
The Court would shift from the uncertainty of the earlier period 
and enter into a period of contradiction where some cases 
seemed to reflect the victim perspective with others reflecting 
the perpetrator perspective. Within these contradictions, the 
seeds of doctrinal instability were planted that would enable 
the Court, years later, to resurrect the ghost of Justice Brad-
ley.61 Lurking in the cases are themes that begin to emerge 
more strongly as the years go by: a concern about unfairly bur-
dening whites and overcompensating blacks. 
For example, in City of Richmond v. United States, the 
Court was faced with whether the city’s annexation of approx-
 
 55. Id. at 11. 
 56. Id. at 17. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 19 (finding that “such plenary power” was not granted to Con-
gress by the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 59. Id. at 21 (“[The] power to pass the law is not found in the Thirteenth 
Amendment.”). Though the Civil Rights Cases has not been overruled, and in 
fact has been cited positively in Romer v. Evans, it has been partially abrogat-
ed, at least with regard to the ability of Congress to reach purely private con-
duct in order “to eradicate conditions that prevent Negroes from buying and 
renting property because of their race or color.” Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 
392 U.S. 409, 438 (1968); cf. United States v. Cannon, 750 F.3d 492, 499 (5th 
Cir. 2014) (discussing the change in the interpretation of Congress’s power 
under the Thirteenth Amendment to reach private conduct from the Civil 
Rights Cases to Alfred H. Mayer). 
 60. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966); Katzenbach v. 
Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 
379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964). 
 61. See infra notes 175–77 and accompanying text. 
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imately twenty-three square miles of adjacent county land ac-
companied by a change in its at-large election of city council 
members was permissible under the Voting Rights Act of 
1965.62 Richmond was subject to § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 
which required preclearance by the Attorney General or ap-
proval by federal court of any change in voting qualifications or 
prerequisites.63 The proposed annexed territory had a popula-
tion that was overwhelmingly white—45,705 whites (96.7%) 
and 1557 blacks (3.3%).64 The effect of annexation was to 
change the racial composition of Richmond, which pre-
annexation was 52% black/48% white to post-annexation, 42% 
black/58% white.65 One of the questions before the Court was 
whether annexation would result in black voter dilution. On its 
face, it appears that annexation would take a majority black 
city and make it majority white. However, because annexation 
was to be accompanied by a switch from an at-large system to a 
ward or district system, the key inquiry for the Court was not 
whether blacks would go from the majority to a minority in the 
newly composed city; instead, all the Court asked was whether 
the black vote pre-annexation would be diluted post-
annexation. In other words, in the newly composed city, would 
blacks be underrepresented on the council?66 In this newly 
composed city, where blacks would now constitute 42% of the 
population and wards/districts were drawn such that four of 
the nine wards (44.4%) would have a majority black population, 
the black vote in the newly composed city could not be said to 
be diluted.67 Instead, taken as a whole, the changes were 
thought to comport with fairness. Further, the effort to have 
wards/districts drawn that would create black majorities in five 
of the nine wards/districts was thought to victimize whites be-
cause it would “allocate to the Negro community in the larger 
city the voting power or the seats on the city council in excess of 
its proportion in the new community and thus permanently . . . 
underrepresent other elements in the community [whites].”68 
Ignored is the fact that prior to annexation, blacks constituted 
a majority, approximately 5/9 of the total population. Annexa-
 
 62. 422 U.S. 358, 359–60 (1975). 
 63. Id. at 361–62. 
 64. Id. at 363. 
 65. Id.  
 66. Id. at 371–72. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 373. 
  
2116 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [100:2103 
 
tion was viewed as a neutral act and all that mattered was the 
possibility of proportional representation pre- and post-
annexation. The fact that blacks went from the majority (5/9) to 
the minority (4/9) was, in the absence of evidence of invidious 
discrimination, not seen as a dilution of their vote because 
blacks retained the prospect of proportional representation 
post-annexation. 
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 included Title VII—Equal 
Employment Opportunity.69 The Court, though, would have to 
determine what it meant for an employer “to fail or refuse to 
hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate 
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such indi-
vidual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”70 In Griggs 
v. Duke Power, the Court was faced with an employer’s ostensi-
bly neutral practices that had a racially disproportionate im-
pact.71 This sets up the tension between the perpetrator per-
spective and the victim perspective. Under the perpetrator 
perspective, nothing is inferred from the fact of racially dispro-
portionate outcomes; the Court accepted the conclusion of the 
lower courts that Duke Power “had adopted the diploma and 
test requirements without any ‘intention to discriminate 
against Negro employees.’”72 However, Griggs, by demanding a 
“justification of ostensibly neutral practices” producing racially 
disproportionate outcomes, shifts “from an emphasis on ‘moti-
vation’ to one on ‘consequences’ mark[ing] a transformation of 
the notion of intent in anti-discrimination law. Henceforth, the 
intentional continuation of a course of conduct producing racial-
ly disproportionate results would be actionable, regardless of 
why the actor chose to continue [absent business necessity].”73  
Because this notion of disparate impact was not codified in 
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, it was expected to apply 
to aspects of employment practices beyond hiring, “especially 
seniority, and to other statutory and constitutional violations in 
areas such as school desegregation, voting, housing, land use 
 
 69. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a–2000a-6 (2012)). 
 70. Id. § 703(a)(1). 
 71. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 427–28 (1971) (examining the 
completion of high school and satisfactory scores on two general intelligence 
tests). 
 72. Id. at 432 (citation omitted). 
 73. Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law, supra note 23, at 1422. 
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regulation, and provision of governmental services.”74 If it had, 
courts would advance the victim perspective and would address 
conditions and outcomes. One commentator, writing the year 
after Griggs, suggested that the decision would help address 
institutional racism so that employers could not rely upon “the 
results of segregation—cultural and educational deprivation—
to become a justification for the perpetuation of segregation.”75 
In addition, it was presumed that  
Neutral practices producing racially disproportionate results would 
have to be justified; that, for the purposes of antidiscrimination law, 
intent would mean no more than voluntary conduct producing racially 
disproportionate results; and that the best way to avoid or at least de-
fer the impact of the first two was to initiate a voluntary affirmative 
action program.76 
The Court in the next era, Rationalization, quashed those 
expectations. Despite its language in Griggs that neutral prac-
tices “cannot be maintained if they operate to ‘freeze’ the status 
quo of prior discriminatory employment practices,”77 the Court 
proceeded to legitimize the status quo in the next era.  
3. 1974–1984: The Era of Rationalization 
Insofar as Griggs offered “a genuine threat to the hegemo-
ny of the perpetrator perspective, then the major task of the era 
of rationalization must be the obliteration of Griggs.”78 In the 
era of rationalization, the Court “employed a method of con-
tainment to defeat any deviant victim perspective expecta-
tions.”79 Specifically, the Court began to deploy key aspects of 
the perpetrator perspective through three legal concepts—
remedy, causation, intent—“insist[ing] on a neat correlation be-
tween violation and remedy, proof of objective causation of in-
jury by the perpetrator, and proof of ‘intent,’ that is, purposeful 
discrimination.”80  
 
 74. Id. 
 75. Herbert N. Bernhardt, Griggs v. Duke Power Co.: The Implications for 
Private and Public Employers, 50 TEX. L. REV. 901, 902 (1972). 
 76. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination, supra note 22, at 1114–
15. 
 77. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430. 
 78. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination, supra note 22, at 1114. 
 79. Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law, supra note 23, at 1422. 
 80. Id. at 1418. 
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a. Intent 
Just five years after Griggs, the Court in Washington v. 
Davis81 was faced with a “test that purported to measure verbal 
ability, vocabulary, reading, and comprehension . . . [used] as a 
criterion for admission to the training program for District of 
Columbia police officers.”82 This test had a negative dispropor-
tionate impact in screening out black applicants.83 One key dif-
ference, though, was that Title VII was not yet applicable to 
government employment so the legal challenge alleged a viola-
tion of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.84 
Though the plaintiffs lost at the district court, they prevailed 
before the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, 
which relied upon Griggs to govern the due process challenge 
brought by the plaintiffs.85 
In reversing, the Supreme Court pronounced that Griggs’ 
disparate impact rubric was limited to Title VII and did not ap-
ply more broadly to due process or equal protection claims.86 
The Court used Washington v. Davis to refocus antidiscrimina-
tion law on intentional or invidious discrimination. It quickly 
canvassed its Equal Protection jurisprudence and emphasized 
that purposeful discrimination had to be established in order to 
prove an equal protection violation with regard to the exclusion 
of Negroes from grand and petit juries in criminal proceed-
ings,87 racial gerrymandering,88 and school desegregation.89 
The Court acknowledged that disparate impact may be a 
factor among the totality of relevant facts from which an invid-
ious discriminatory purpose may be inferred.90 However, it em-
phasized that it disagreed with lower courts “to the extent that 
 
 81. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
 82. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination, supra note 22, at 1115. 
 83. Davis, 426 U.S. at 235. 
 84. The complaint also alleged two statutory violations, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 
and D.C. Code § 1-320, but partial summary judgment was sought by plaintiffs 
only on the due process violation, which is the issue on appeal before the Su-
preme Court. Davis, 426 U.S. at 233–36. 
 85. Davis v. Washington, 512 F.2d 956, 959 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev’d, 426 
U.S. 229 (1976). 
 86. Davis, 426 U.S. at 238–39. 
 87. Id. (citing Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 403–04 (1945); Strauder v. 
West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880)). 
 88. Id. at 240 (citing Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964)). 
 89. Id. (“The essential element of de jure segregation is ‘a current condi-
tion of segregation resulting from intentional state action.’” (quoting Keyes v. 
School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 205 (1973))). 
 90. Id. at 242. 
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those cases rested on or expressed the view that proof of dis-
criminatory racial purpose is unnecessary in making out an 
equal protection violation.”91 The Court expressed its concern 
that: 
A rule that a statute designed to serve neutral ends is nevertheless 
invalid, absent compelling justification, if in practice it benefits or 
burdens one race more than another would be far reaching and would 
raise serious questions about, and perhaps invalidate, a whole range 
of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, and licensing statutes that 
may be more burdensome to the poor and to the average black than to 
the more affluent white.92 
Discriminatory purpose is the bedrock of antidiscrimination 
law. 
b. Remedy 
In International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 
the Court had to decide if a remedy under Title VII could inval-
idate a seniority system in a collectively bargained agreement 
that perpetuated the effects of pre-Title VII discrimination.93 
The Court acknowledged that the seniority system in question 
had resulted in the situation where 
because of the employer’s prior intentional discrimination, the line 
drivers with the longest tenure are without exception white, the ad-
vantages of the seniority system flow disproportionately to them and 
away from Negro and Spanish-surnamed employees who might by 
now have enjoyed those advantages had not the employer discrimi-
nated before the passage of the Act. This disproportionate distribution 
of advantages does in a very real sense “operate to ‘freeze’ the status 
quo of prior discriminatory employment practices.”94 
Nevertheless, the Court determined that the literal terms 
of Title VII and its legislative history provide a measure of im-
munity to such seniority systems.95 This protects the settled ex-
pectations of the beneficiaries of discrimination, as it would be 
unfair to impose a remedy whose costs are borne by innocent 
white workers when the constitutional violation was committed 
by the perpetrator employer or union. The Court would express 
 
 91. Id. at 245. The Court cited numerous appellate and district court cas-
es dealing with public employment, urban renewal, zoning, public housing, 
and municipal services that had improperly extended Griggs. Id. at 244 n.12. 
 92. Id. at 248. 
 93. 431 U.S. 324, 343 (1977). 
 94. Id. at 349–50. 
 95. Id. at 350. 
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this more strongly in Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. 
Stotts,96 a case that in 1984 would usher in the Era of Denial. 
c. Causation 
As the Washington v. Davis Court noted in commenting on 
its school desegregation cases, the result—segregated schools—
had to be linked directly to intentional state action. Causation 
becomes a concept the Court manipulates to rationalize the sta-
tus quo. Thus, “[d]espite extensive de jure segregation in the 
City of Detroit, the Court refused to approve a remedy that 
would consolidate Detroit schools with those of surrounding 
suburbs for the purpose of achieving an integrated result.”97 
The Court reasoned that the perpetrator was the City of De-
troit and not the (largely white) suburban school districts that 
had not engaged in de jure segregation or the (white) parents 
that had moved from the city to the suburbs.98 The Court em-
phasized that “without an interdistrict violation and 
interdistrict effect, there is no constitutional wrong calling for 
an interdistrict remedy.”99 
Freeman notes that the lessons from Milliken and San An-
tonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, “which rejected 
a claim of resource equalization among school districts without 
regard to ability to pay,” were “stark and clear: if whites can 
find a way to leave the inner city, they may legally insulate 
their finances and schools from the demands of blacks for racial 
equality.”100 Any segregative consequences that result from the 
private actions of white families in response to school desegre-
gation are beyond the remedial power of the courts.101 In this 
way, black inequality becomes rationalized as beyond the re-
medial reach of the courts. 
 
 
 96. 467 U.S. 561 (1984). 
 97. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination, supra note 22, at 1108 
(discussing Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974)). 
 98. Milliken, 418 U.S. at 745. 
 99. Id.  
 100. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination, supra note 22, at 1108. 
 101. Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler finishes what the Mil-
liken Court started. 427 U.S. 424 (1976). Once a race-neutral plan was imple-
mented, efforts by the district court to alter the plan to address post-remedy 
intradistrict movement of families that resulted in resegregation of some of 
the schools exceeded the court’s remedial authority. Id. at 433.  
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4. 1984–????: The Era of Denial 
Approximately a decade after Legitimizing Racial Discrim-
ination, Freeman revisited his thesis and declared a new era, 
Denial, during which the Court completes the  
dismantling process that had begun in the period of rationaliza-
tion . . . to reconsider, and reject, the implicit assumptions in Weber. 
Once statistical disparities cease to be presumptive violations, and 
remedies mandating numerical results are no longer required (or 
even permitted), the reality of inequality experienced by black Ameri-
cans becomes just another neutral feature of our socioeconomic land-
scape.102 
Though several affirmative action programs in the context 
of employment were found to be constitutional,103 leading one 
commentator to announce that “the effort to kill affirmative ac-
tion programs has failed,”104 this era saw the Justices giving 
greater credence to the argument that affirmative action pro-
grams benefit non-victims and place unfair burdens on inno-
cent non-perpetrators.105  
The Court limited the reach of affirmative action in the 
context of layoffs. In Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. 
Stotts106 and Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,107 the 
Court rejected the authority of the trial court to protect recent-
ly hired minority workers with less seniority from layoffs in 
contravention of an existing seniority system that favored 
white workers with greater seniority.108 Stotts made clear that a 
recently hired minority worker could be granted retroactive 
seniority only if that worker proved that she or he was a victim 
of past discrimination by that employer and could prove that 
but for this discrimination, the worker would have been hired 
and accrued seniority.109 However, in most instances, recently 
 
 102. Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law, supra note 23, at 1426–27. 
 103. Johnson v. Transp. Agency, Santa Clara Cty., 480 U.S. 616 (1987); 
United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987); Local 28, Sheet Metal Work-
ers’ Int’l Ass’n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986); Local 93, Int’l Ass’n of Firefight-
ers, AFL-CIO v. Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501 (1986). 
 104. Herman Schwartz, The 1986 and 1987 Affirmative Action Cases: It’s 
All Over but the Shouting, 86 MICH. L. REV. 524, 576 (1987). 
 105. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Disease As Cure: “In Order to Get Beyond 
Racism, We Must First Take Account of Race,” 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 147, 154 
(“The affirmative action system now in place . . . is based upon concepts of ra-
cial indebtedness and racial entitlement rather than individual worth and in-
dividual need; that is to say, because it is racist.”). 
 106. 467 U.S. 561 (1984). 
 107. 476 U.S. 267 (1986). 
 108. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 283–84; Stotts, 467 U.S. at 578. 
 109. Stotts, 467 U.S. at 578–79 (citing Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United 
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hired workers are not able to meet this high burden, and even 
if discriminatory hiring practices are proven, “mere member-
ship in the disadvantaged class is insufficient to warrant a sen-
iority award.”110  
Wygant was a reverse discrimination lawsuit brought by 
white teachers who were laid off while minority teachers with 
less seniority were retained. In finding that this practice violat-
ed the Equal Protection Clause, the Court noted that there was 
a key difference between preferential hiring plans and prefer-
ential layoff plans: “While hiring goals impose a diffuse burden, 
often foreclosing only one of several opportunities, layoffs im-
pose the entire burden of achieving racial equality on particular 
individuals . . . .”111 In describing the position of these innocent 
(white) workers, the Court observed: 
A worker may invest many productive years in one job and one city 
with the expectation of earning the stability and security of seniority. 
“At that point, the rights and expectations surrounding seniority 
make up what is probably the most valuable capital asset that the 
worker ‘owns,’ worth even more than the current equity in his home.” 
Layoffs disrupt these settled expectations in a way that general hir-
ing goals do not.112 
These settled expectations become a property interest that the 
law protects, even though “many white employees would not 
have been hired in the first place” absent racial discrimination, 
“and would therefore have no basis to claim seniority prefer-
ences.”113 
Several cases decided during October Term 1988 tried to 
consolidate the pushback on civil rights that characterized the 
Era of Denial.114 Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio severely lim-
ited Griggs by requiring: (1) a more specific showing with re-
 
States, 431 U.S. 324, 367–371 (1977); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 
747 (1976)). 
 110. Id. at 579. 
 111. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 283. 
 112. Id. (citation omitted). 
 113. See Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 
1776 (1993). 
 114. See generally Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) 
(overturning much of Griggs); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989) (permit-
ting collateral challenge by white firefighters, jeopardizing consent decrees 
that had resulted in remedial affirmative action policies); City of Richmond v. 
J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (holding that strict scrutiny is to be ap-
plied for race remedial affirmative action policies enacted by subnational gov-
ernmental entities); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989) 
(limiting Title VII to hiring and not harassment or other discrimination after 
employment). 
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gard to disparate impact to establish a prima facie case;115 (2) a 
stricter demonstration of causation where a particular hiring 
practice, rather than aggregate practices, had to be proven to 
have a significant disparate impact;116 and (3) changing the 
Griggs’ burden shifting regime so that once a prima facie case 
was established, the employer had only a burden of producing 
evidence of a business justification for the challenged practice, 
but the “burden of persuasion, however, remain[ed] with the 
disparate-impact plaintiff.”117 
Martin v. Wilks was another form of a reverse discrimina-
tion case in which white firefighters brought a collateral chal-
lenge to a consent decree that resulted in an affirmative action 
program that included goals for hiring and promoting black 
firefighters.118 The failure of the white firefighters to intervene 
earlier in the proceedings leading to the consent decree was 
held to not bar them from pursuing a later collateral chal-
lenge.119 The Court, in permitting this challenge by the white 
firefighters, “invite[d] legal attack by aggrieved whites on 
longstanding affirmative action programs originating in litiga-
tion, and it confers on whites a continuing right to complain 
about reverse discrimination in court.”120  
Patterson v. McClean Credit Union involved a claim based 
on 42 U.S.C. § 1981 brought by a black female employee who 
claimed that she had been harassed, not promoted, and then 
discharged, all because of her race.121 Though the Court af-
firmed its holding that § 1981 reaches private conduct and pro-
hibits racial discrimination with regard to making and enforc-
ing contracts,122 it stated that § 1981 does not reach conduct by 
the employer after contract formation.123 In refusing to reach 
this private conduct, the Court stated: 
The law now reflects society’s consensus that discrimination based on 
the color of one’s skin is a profound wrong of tragic dimension. Nei-
ther our words nor our decisions should be interpreted as signaling 
one inch of retreat from Congress’ policy to forbid discrimination in 
 
 115. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 654–55. 
 116. Id. at 656–58. 
 117. Id. at 659. 
 118. Wilks, 490 U.S. at 758. 
 119. Id. at 768. 
 120. Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law, supra note 23, at 1432. 
 121. 491 U.S. 164, 169 (1989). 
 122. Id. at 175. 
 123. Id. at 179–80 (noting, though, that racial harassment during the 
course of employment is actionable under Title VII). 
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the private, as well as the public, sphere. Nevertheless, in the area of 
private discrimination, to which the ordinance of the Constitution 
does not directly extend, our role is limited to interpreting what Con-
gress may do and has done. The statute before us, which is only part 
of Congress’ extensive civil rights legislation, does not cover the acts 
of harassment alleged here.124 
Even while severely limiting the reach of federal antidiscrimi-
nation law, the Court professed its commitment to the principle 
of racial justice. 
In these three cases (and in Price Waterhouse v. 
kins125), the Court in its zeal to curtail even further the reach of 
antidiscrimination law overplayed its hand. Congress, two 
years later, would enact the Civil Rights Act of 1991 that would 
overrule key aspects of the Supreme Court’s overreach.126 
One major case, City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., from 
that Supreme Court term survived and is an exemplar of the 
technique of denial.127 Croson involved a challenge to the Rich-
mond City Council’s Minority Business Utilization Plan, which 
 
 124. Id. at 188. 
 125. 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (finding the causation requirement in Title VII 
permits an employer to avoid liability if it can prove that it would have made 
the same decision despite the existence of an improper discriminatory motive). 
 126. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 made these findings and expressed the 
following purposes: 
SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 
The Congress finds that— 
(1) additional remedies under Federal law are needed to deter un-
lawful harassment and intentional discrimination in the work-
place; 
(2) the decision of the Supreme Court in Wards Cove Packing Co. 
v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) has weakened the scope and effec-
tiveness of Federal civil rights protections; and 
(3) legislation is necessary to provide additional protections 
against unlawful discrimination in employment. 
SEC. 3. PURPOSES. 
The purposes of this Act are— 
(1) to provide appropriate remedies for intentional discrimination 
and unlawful harassment in the workplace; 
(2) to codify the concepts of “business necessity” and “job related” 
enunciated by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 
401 U.S. 424 (1971), and in the other Supreme Court decisions 
prior to Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989); 
(3) to confirm statutory authority and provide statutory guide-
lines for the adjudication of disparate impact suits under title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq.); and 
(4) to respond to recent decisions of the Supreme Court by ex-
panding the scope of relevant civil rights statutes in order to pro-
vide adequate protection to victims of discrimination. 
Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2–3 (1991). 
 127. 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
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required “prime contractors to whom the city awarded con-
struction contracts to subcontract at least 30% of the dollar 
amount of the contract to one or more Minority Business En-
terprises.”128 Doctrinally, Croson is important because it estab-
lished that remedial racial classifications are subject to the 
same level of scrutiny as discriminatory racial classifications.129 
Justice O’Connor’s opinion observed that the program had been 
enacted by a city council where five of its nine members were 
black and noted that “[t]he concern that a political majority will 
more easily act to the disadvantage of a minority based on un-
warranted assumptions or incomplete facts would seem to mili-
tate for, not against, the application of heightened judicial scru-
tiny in this case.”130 Further, the Court emphasized that the 
city of Richmond needed a strong basis in evidence in order to 
justify remedial action.131 The fact that in a city with a 50% 
black population where 0.67% of prime contracts in a five-year 
period were awarded to minority contractors was insufficient 
evidence.132 The fact that in 1977 Congress had determined 
“that the effects of past discrimination had stifled minority par-
ticipation in the construction industry nationally” did not pro-
vide a strong basis in evidence that this was the case in Rich-
mond.133 The fact that there were very few minority contractors 
in local and state contractors’ associations was not enough. Nor 
were statements that there had been past discrimination in the 
construction industry.134 The Court went so far as to say that 
“none of the evidence presented by the city points to any identi-
fied discrimination in the Richmond construction industry.”135 
We are left then with the world as it is—a city with a 50% 
black population with 0.67% of prime contracts going to minori-
ty business enterprises136—as being a fact disconnected from 
racial discrimination, and thus, beyond the power of law to re-
dress. 
 
 128. Id. at 477. 
 129. Id. at 493–94. 
 130. Id. at 495–96. 
 131. Id. at 500 (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277 
(1986)). 
 132. Id. at 499. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 500; see also id. at 501 (declaring that a “governmental actor 
cannot render race a legitimate proxy for a particular condition merely by de-
claring that the condition exists”).  
 135. Id. at 505. 
 136. Id. at 479–80. 
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The Court also found it troubling that Richmond’s set-aside 
program also included Spanish-speaking, Oriental, Indian, Es-
kimo, or Aleut as minorities.137 Noting that Richmond may have 
never had an Aleut or Eskimo citizen, that the program might 
provide a remedy to someone who may have never suffered past 
discrimination in the construction industry in Richmond was 
seen to be grossly over-inclusive and to “strongly impugn[] the 
city’s claim of remedial motivation.”138  
Croson provides the most striking example of denial when 
the Court stated, with no sense of irony, that “[b]lacks may be 
disproportionately attracted to industries other than construc-
tion.”139 One wonders if Justice O’Connor was talking about the 
same Richmond as Justice Marshall.140 Justice Marshall opens 
his dissent by stating, “It is a welcome symbol of racial progress 
when the former capital of the Confederacy acts forthrightly to 
confront the effects of racial discrimination in its midst.”141 
Marshall writes that this is the same Richmond whose 
 1969 annexation plan “was infected by the impermissible 
purpose of denying the right to vote based on race 
through perpetuating white majority power to exclude 
Negroes from office through at-large elections”;142 
 “sordid history of . . . [its] attempts to circumvent, defeat, 
and nullify the holding of Brown I has been recorded in 
the opinions of this and other courts”;143 and 
 “numerous public and private acts of discrimination” tend-
ed to “perpetuate apartheid of the races in ghetto pat-
terns throughout the city . . . .”144 
 
 137. See id. at 506 (“There is absolutely no evidence of past discrimination 
against Spanish-speaking, Oriental, Indian, Eskimo, or Aleut persons in any 
aspect of the Richmond construction industry.”). 
 138. Id. (citing Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 284 n.13 
(1986)). 
 139. Id. at 503.  
 140. Compare the different histories in Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion 
with Marshall’s dissent. Id. 
 141. Id. at 528. See generally Thomas Ross, The Richmond Narratives, 68 
TEX. L. REV. 381 (1989). For further analysis of Croson, see Peter Charles 
Hoffer, “Blind to History”: The Use of History in Affirmative Action Suits: An-
other Look at City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 23 RUTGERS L.J. 271 
(1992). 
 142. City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358, 373 (1975) (discuss-
ing and adopting the Special Master’s conclusions about the earlier annexa-
tion plan); see also supra text accompanying notes 63–68. 
 143. Bradley v. Sch. Bd. of Richmond, 462 F.2d 1058, 1075 (4th Cir. 1972) 
(Winter, J., dissenting), aff’d, 412 U.S. 92 (1973). 
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Notwithstanding these facts, the Croson Court comments 
that “it is sheer speculation how many minority firms there 
would be in Richmond absent past societal discrimination.”145 
The world made by discrimination becomes frozen as the status 
quo; black inequality is rationalized and then denied. 
C. EXTENDING FREEMAN’S PERIODIZATION146 
A year after Freeman’s Antidiscrimination Law article, the 
Supreme Court decided Board of Education of Oklahoma City 
Public Schools v. Dowell.147 The Court expressed the view that 
desegregation decrees were not intended to operate into perpe-
tuity, and that a district court, in determining whether to dis-
solve a desegregation decree, did not have to find that the ves-
tiges of past discrimination had been eliminated.148 Instead, the 
correct inquiry was whether the school district had complied in 
good faith with the desegregation decree and the vestiges of 
past discrimination had been eliminated to the extent practica-
ble.149 This made it much easier for school districts to establish 
that they had achieved unitary status, which would end federal 
court supervision. Perhaps it should not come as a surprise 
that desegregation peaked in the early 1990s, with resegrega-
tion occurring thereafter.150  
A set of three cases decided in 1995 marks the end of the 
era of denial and the ushering in of what some describe as post-
civil rights America.151 In Miller v. Johnson, the Court empha-
 
 144. Id. at 1065. 
 145. Croson, 488 U.S. at 499. 
 146. Professor Freeman passed away in 1995 and did not revisit his thesis 
after his 1990 Antidiscrimination Law article. 
 147. 498 U.S. 237 (1991). 
 148. Id. at 249–50. 
 149. Id. 
 150. See Sam Erman & Gregory M. Walton, Stereotype Threat and Antidis-
crimination Law: Affirmative Steps to Promote Meritocracy and Racial Equali-
ty in Education, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 307, 321 (2015) (citing GARY ORFIELD ET 
AL., E. PLURIBUS . . . SEPARATION: DEEPENING DOUBLE SEGREGATION FOR 
MORE STUDENTS, CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT 17–19, 22–23, 32–33, 76–77 (2012), 
http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/integration-and 
-diversity/mlk-national/e-pluribus...separation-deepening-double-segregation 
-for-more-students/orfield_epluribus_revised_omplete_2012.pdf). 
 151. Though the term “post-civil rights era” is used sometimes to refer to 
the period after the 1960s civil rights acts, I use it to refer to the period where 
“Supreme Court decisions have departed [dramatically] from established civil 
rights approaches.” See Vicki Schultz & Stephen Petterson, Race, Gender, 
Work, and Choice: An Empirical Study of the Lack of Interest Defense in Title 
VII Cases Challenging Job Segregation, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 1073, 1087 (1992) 
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sized that the Voting Rights Act of 1965 was intended to grant 
“authority to the federal courts to uncover official efforts to 
abridge minorities’ right to vote” but not to require states to 
engage in “presumptively unconstitutional race-based district-
ing.”152 In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, the Court fin-
ished what it had begun in Croson by extending the application 
of strict scrutiny of all racial classifications by state and local 
governments to the federal government.153 In both Miller and 
Adarand, the racial remedy is equated with, and found equally 
offensive to, racial discrimination. In Missouri v. Jenkins,154 the 
Court clarified its holding in Milliken I, which found 
interdistrict remedies to be beyond the remedial authority of 
the district court if it extended to “innocent” districts in which 
segregation could not be said to have been caused by the offend-
ing district.155 In Jenkins, the state of Missouri and the offend-
ing district attempted to attract (white) students from other 
districts (the suburbs) by spending a lot of money to create 
magnet schools in the offending district.156 The Jenkins Court 
ruled that this was an impermissible attempt to do an end run 
around its holding in Milliken I.157 In addition, the Jenkins 
Court expressed what might be termed “racial exhaustion,”158 
noting at the outset of its opinion that “[a]s this school desegre-
gation litigation enters its 18th year, we are called upon again 
 
(“[W]e inhabit a period that is widely described as the ‘post-Civil Rights era.’”). 
The term “post-civil rights America” starts to make its way into the law review 
literature in the early 1990s. See, e.g., John O. Calmore, Critical Race Theory, 
Archie Shepp, and Fire Music: Securing an Authentic Intellectual Life in a 
Multicultural World, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2129, 2206 n.284 (1992) (noting “at 
least 12 themes reflected in the move from the civil rights era of the mid-1960s 
to the present post-civil rights era”); Eric K. Yamamoto, Rethinking Alliances: 
Agency, Responsibility and Interracial Justice, 3 ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 33, 36 
(1995) (describing the post-civil rights era as marked by “the end of the civil 
rights movements of the 1960s and 1970s and the ideological dismantling of 
civil rights approaches to racial justice”). 
 152. 515 U.S. 900, 927 (1995). 
 153. 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (“[W]e hold today that all racial classifica-
tions, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local government actor, must be 
analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.”). 
 154. 515 U.S. 70 (1995). 
 155. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 745 (1974). 
 156. Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 76–77. 
 157. Id. at 94. 
 158. Darren Hutchinson explores the theme of racial exhaustion, describ-
ing Justice Bradley’s opinion in the Civil Rights Cases as an exemplar and 
how it has played out in history and in contemporary politics and jurispru-
dence. See generally Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Racial Exhaustion, 86 WASH. 
U. L. REV. 917 (2009). 
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to review the decisions of the lower courts.”159 This echoed the 
opinion in Dowell that desegregation decrees were not intended 
to operate into perpetuity. One can be “special favorites” for on-
ly so long.160 
The next two decades would see more iterations of a post-
civil rights America. In Shelby County v. Holder, the Court 
went beyond Miller and found that the § 4(b) formula for de-
termining which jurisdictions are subject to the preclearance 
requirements of § 5 of the Voting Rights Act to be unconstitu-
tional.161 
In Ricci v. DeStefano, a reverse discrimination lawsuit 
brought by one Hispanic and seventeen white firefighters, the 
Court had to address the inevitable tension between disparate 
treatment and disparate impact when an employer acted af-
firmatively to avoid disparate impact.162 In 2003, the New Ha-
ven Fire Department administered a test to fill a number of 
openings for promotion to lieutenant and captain.163 The pass 
rate for African Americans and Hispanics was far lower than it 
was for whites.164 When the city recognized that the promotion 
exam had a disproportionate negative impact on black and 
Hispanic applicants, the city’s Civil Service Board, an inde-
pendent review board that must vote to certify test results be-
fore the promotion process could continue, held hearings and 
ultimately refused to certify the test results.165 As a result, 
promotions were not given.166 The reverse discrimination claim 
alleged that New Haven, regardless of its potential liability for 
disparate impact had it accepted the test results, had engaged 
in disparate treatment on the basis of race.167 
Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, assumed that be-
cause the city looked at the results and saw the racially dispar-
ate impact, it must have known that refusing to certify the test 
results would negatively affect a group of test takers who nec-
 
 159. Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 73. 
 160. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883). 
 161. 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013). 
 162. 557 U.S. 557 (2009). Justice Scalia in his concurrence makes clear 
that the Court has deferred deciding what he describes as “the war between 
disparate impact and equal protection.” Id. at 595. 
 163. Id. at 566. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 567–74. 
 166. Id. at 574. 
 167. Id. at 575. 
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essarily were predominantly white.168 Thus, the city’s race con-
scious decision, seeking to avoid a racially disproportionate im-
pact, was taken as intentional racial discrimination against the 
group that had performed well on the test.169 Justice Kennedy 
recognized the tension between disparate impact and disparate 
treatment. Can the fear of disparate impact liability justify dis-
parate treatment? Justice Kennedy resolved this question by 
articulating a new standard under which New Haven might be 
able to avoid disparate treatment liability if there was a strong 
basis in evidence that, had it not taken the action, it would 
have been liable under the disparate impact statute.170 One 
problem though is that the Court leaves open the possibility 
that even if an employer meets the “strong-basis-in-evidence 
standard,” this will not necessarily insulate an employer from 
liability from a disparate treatment plaintiff; a strong basis in 
evidence of disparate impact may still not justify discriminato-
ry treatment under the Constitution.171 Ricci sets up the inevi-
table conflict between disparate impact and disparate treat-
ment that may complete the attempt by the October Term 1988 
Supreme Court to essentially overturn Griggs, despite the ex-
plicit statutory espousal of Griggs in the Civil Rights Act of 
1991. 
An additional aspect of this case relates to the question of 
what is the appropriate temporal framework. When one reads 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion or Justice Alito’s concurrence, the 
facts in this case are presented as if there were no past. We 
have only the disappointed meritorious firefighters, the City of 
New Haven, and various public officials who worked to block 
their promotions. This might be contrasted with Justice Gins-
berg’s approach. She notes the long, pervasive history of racial 
discrimination practiced by municipal fire departments.172 She 
notes that New Haven shared in this history, including a 1973 
 
 168. Id. at 584. 
 169. One wonders if any affirmative action program in any context could 
survive this logic. For example, if a school selected a race neutral alternative 
that produced the desired race conscious result, one commentator points out 
that “it is unclear why those alternatives would not themselves violate the 
Washington v. Davis prohibition on intentional discrimination.” Girardeau A. 
Spann, Good Faith Discrimination, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 585, 602–03 
(2015).  
 170. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 585. 
 171. Id. at 584 (“We also do not hold that meeting the strong-basis-in-
evidence standard would satisfy the Equal Protection Clause in a future 
case.”). 
 172. Id. at 610. 
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lawsuit by black firefighters that resulted in 1974 consent de-
cree that was largely ineffective in diversifying the fire de-
partment.173 Justice Ginsberg argued that the city’s actions had 
to be placed within this context. However, her view did not car-
ry the day, and as we have seen in the course of antidiscrimina-
tion law, it is applied in an ahistorical manner. Divorced from 
history, perhaps it is no wonder that the Court found in favor of 
the reverse discrimination plaintiffs.174 
In Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle 
School District No. 1, the Court examined the legal question of 
“whether a public school that had not operated legally segre-
gated schools or has been found to be unitary may choose to 
classify students by race and rely upon that classification in 
making school assignments”175 and answered it in the nega-
tive.176 The Court’s opinion concludes with a sentence that re-
vives the ghost of Justice Bradley, where racial minorities can 
no longer depend on being the special favorites of the law. Jus-
tice Roberts pronounces, “The way to stop discrimination on the 
basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.”177 
Under this reasoning, any form of racial remediation is itself 
racial discrimination. 
If only it were that simple. 
 
 173. Id. at 610–11. 
 174. In addition, Ricci set up the inevitable conflict between disparate 
treatment and disparate impact. See id. at 595; see also Briscoe v. City of New 
Haven, 654 F.3d 200 (2d Cir. 2011) (analyzing a disparate impact claim by a 
black firefighter who was not promoted following the Supreme Court’s order in 
Ricci to reinstate the test results despite its disparate impact). 
 175. 551 U.S. 701, 711 (2007). 
 176. Id. at 747–48. 
 177. Id. at 748. 
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II.  THE FREEMAN HYPOTHESIS AND LGBT 
ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW178   
The course of race antidiscrimination law in education 
went from Brown to Parents Involved; in employment, from 
Griggs to Ricci; in voting from Katzenbach v. McClung to Shel-
by County. Despite decades of the Court’s enforcement of anti-
discrimination law, in 2015, 35 to 45% of black and Latino stu-
dents attend “intensely segregated schools;”179 racial minorities 
live in segregated neighborhoods;180 racial discrimination per-
sists in the job market181 and in the housing market;182 typical 
black households have “just 6% of the wealth of the typical 
white household”;183 and racial minorities remain politically 
 
 178. This Part is informed by what might be described as foundational ar-
ticles from the early to mid-1990s putting forward a jurisprudential vision for 
addressing LGBT discrimination. See generally RUTHANN ROBSON, LESBIAN 
(OUT)LAW: SURVIVAL UNDER THE RULE OF LAW (1992); William N. Eskridge, 
Jr., Gaylegal Narratives, 46 STAN. L. REV. 607 (1994); Katherine Franke, The 
Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The Disaggregation of Sex from 
Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1995); Janet E. Halley, The Politics of the Closet: 
Towards Equal Protection for Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L. 
REV. 915 (1989); Nan D. Hunter, Life After Hardwick, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 531 (1992); Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians 
and Gay Men Is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197 (1994); Jane S. 
Schacter, The Gay Civil Rights Debate in the States: Decoding the Discourse of 
Equivalents, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 283 (1994); Francisco Valdes, Queers, 
Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of “Sex,” “Gender,” 
and “Sexual Orientation” in Euro-American Law and Society, 83 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1 (1995).  
 179. Erman & Walton, supra note 150, at 321–22 (citation omitted). 
 180. See Alana Semuels, Where the White People Live: How Self-
Segregation and Concentrated Affluence Became Normal in America, 
ATLANTIC (Apr. 10, 2015) http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/ 
04/where-the-white-people-live/390153. 
 181. See Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg 
More Employable than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor 
Market Discrimination, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 991 (2004) (concluding employ-
ment discrimination applies equally across the employment market); Angela 
Onwuachi-Willig & Mario L. Barnes, By Any Other Name? On Being “Regard-
ed as” Black, and Why Title VII Should Apply Even if Lakisha and Jamal Are 
White, 2005 WISC. L. REV. 1283. 
 182. See generally MARGERY AUSTIN TURNER ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. &  
URBAN DEV., HOUSING DISCRIMINATION AGAINST RACIAL AND ETHNIC MINOR-
ITIES 2012 (2013), http://www.huduser.gov/portal/Publications/pdf/HUD-514_ 
HDS2012.pdf.  
 183. Laura Shin, The Racial Wealth Gap: Why a Typical White Household 
Has 16 Times the Wealth of a Black One, FORBES (Mar. 26, 2015, 8:00 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/laurashin/2015/03/26/the-racial-wealth-gap-why 
-a-typical-white-household-has-16-times-the-wealth-of-a-black-one/ 
#23233dcf6c5b. These wealth differences exist for every income quintile. See 
Robert S. Chang & Jerome M. Culp, Jr., Business as Usual? Brown and the 
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powerless.184 With the course of race antidiscrimination law as 
a backdrop, this Part examines possible trajectories for LGBT 
antidiscrimination law. Trajectory 1 is, perhaps, already un-
derway, in which LGBT antidiscrimination law is treated as 
sex discrimination. Following this path would require only an 
extension of the way that some LGBT discrimination is already 
recognized as sex discrimination. This trajectory has the ad-
vantage of already having a doctrinal architecture but may ul-
timately fail because not all LGBT discrimination can be de-
scribed as sex discrimination. Trajectory 2 would require the 
Supreme Court to recognize LGBT persons as belonging to a 
distinct suspect or quasi-suspect category. Trajectory 3 specu-
lates that regardless of whether the Supreme Court recognizes 
a new suspect or quasi-suspect category, Congress will likely 
amend some of its civil rights statutes to grant formal equality, 
but that once this is achieved, the Court will engage in tactics 
similar to what has occurred in race antidiscrimination law. In 
some ways, the Court has already begun employing some of 
these tactics. These tactics will rely on narrow interpretations 
of any statutory changes and upon manipulation of the pub-
lic/private distinction as well as the accommodation of religion.  
This Part begins, though, by discussing the course of LGBT 
antidiscrimination law thus far. 
A. THE COURSE OF LGBT ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW THUS FAR 
Thus far, the course of LGBT antidiscrimination law has 
been defined largely by the failure of law to protect the rights of 
LGBT persons. William Eskridge writes that “[i]n 1956, it was 
not exactly illegal to be a ‘homosexual’ in the United States, but 
it was a felony to make love to anyone of the same sex, and 
mere suspicion of homosexuality could cost a citizen her liveli-
hood.”185 Efforts to get the courts to recognize discrimination 
against LGBT persons were rejected or fell on deaf ears. An ex-
ample was the effort of Dr. Franklin Kameny to challenge his 
dismissal from the Army and his being barred from federal em-
ployment by the Civil Service Commission following his arrest 
 
Continuing Conundrum of Race in America, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 1181, 1185–
87. 
 184. Cf. Toni M. Massaro, Gay Rights, Thick and Thin, 49 STAN. L. REV. 
45, 75 (1996) (discussing “African-Americans’ historical political powerlessness 
and its present consequences”). 
 185. William N. Eskridge, Jr., January 27, 1961: The Birth of Gaylegal 
Equality Arguments, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 39, 39 (2001). 
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for solicitation.186 After his claim was dismissed, on January 27, 
1961, he filed a pro se certiorari petition to the Supreme Court 
in which he argued that the employment bar “makes of the ho-
mosexual a second-rate citizen, by discriminating against him 
without reasonable cause.”187 The Supreme Court, without 
comment, denied his petition.188 Then in 1986, the Court explic-
itly rendered constitutional laws similar to the one that led to 
Dr. Kameny’s arrest when it determined that state laws crimi-
nalizing “homosexual sodomy [sic]”189 between consenting 
adults did not violate a fundamental right of homosexuals.190 
In the midst of federal sanctioning of anti-LGBT discrimi-
nation, a number of states and local governments began enact-
ing civil rights protections on the basis of sexual orientation.191 
In Colorado, in response to certain municipalities enacting pro-
tective civil rights legislation to protect against discrimination 
on the basis of sexual orientation, a statewide referendum 
known as Amendment 2 was voted into law.192 It operated to in-
validate all of these protections and to prohibit “all legislative, 
executive or judicial action at any level of state or local gov-
ernment designed to protect the named class, a class we shall 
 
 186. Id. at 40. 
 187. Id. at 41 (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 32, Kameny v. Brucker, 365 
U.S. 843 (1961) (No. 60-676)). 
 188. Id. at 42. 
 189. Though the Court characterized the activity this way, I think the 
“[sic]” designation is appropriate. 
 190. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986), overruled by Lawrence 
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 191. See Developments in the Law—Employment Discrimination, 109 
HARV. L. REV. 1568, 1625, 1627 (1996) (noting nine states and a large number 
of local governments have enacted some gay civil rights protections); Schacter, 
supra note 178, at 286–87 (listing the eight states that as of 1994 had 
statewide protections, all of which prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex-
ual orientation, and some of which extended to public accommodations, hous-
ing, education, insurance, and credit or banking). 
 192. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996). The Amendment read: 
No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian or Bisexual Ori-
entation. Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches 
or departments, nor any of its agencies, political subdivisions, munic-
ipalities or school districts, shall enact, adopt or enforce any statute, 
regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisex-
ual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute or 
otherwise be the basis of or entitle any person or class of persons to 
have or claim any minority status, quota preferences, protected status 
or claim of discrimination. This Section of the Constitution shall be in 
all respects self-executing. 
COLO. CONST. art II, § 30b, quoted in Romer, 517 U.S. at 624. 
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refer to as homosexual persons or gays and lesbians.”193 Initial-
ly challenged in state court, the Colorado Supreme Court inval-
idated the amendment as failing strict scrutiny, which the 
court thought was required based on federal voting rights cases 
and the discriminatory restructuring of governmental 
decisionmaking.194 Justice Kennedy, in a cryptic opinion,195 did 
not directly address the Colorado Supreme Court’s rationale 
other than describing it, and then stating that it affirmed the 
judgment of that court but on a different rationale.196 The opin-
ion has come to be characterized as “rational basis with bite,” 
and some commentators have placed Romer as following along 
United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno197 and City 
of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.198 What distin-
guishes these three cases from the typical rational basis appli-
cation is that, while formally under rational basis review, each 
involved animus against a particular group.199 The animus re-
quires, then, that the legislation be subject to a more searching 
scrutiny. 
Though the majority opinion in Romer did not mention 
Bowers v. Hardwick, an absence pointedly noted by Justice 
 
 193. Romer, 517 U.S. at 624. 
 194. Id. at 625 (citing Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270 (Colo. 1993)) 
(citations omitted). 
 195. A number of commentators over the years described the opinion and 
the Court’s reasoning as cryptic. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, Textualism and 
the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1373, 1381 (1998); 
Michael Stokes Paulsen, Does the Supreme Court’s Current Doctrine of Stare 
Decisis Require Adherence to the Supreme Court’s Current Doctrine of Stare 
Decisis, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1165, 1186 (2008) (noting Romer’s “notoriously cryptic 
majority opinion”); Jane S. Schacter, Unequal Inequalities? Poverty, Sexual 
Orientation, and the Dynamics of Constitutional Law, 2014 UTAH. L. REV. 867, 
870 (noting that Romer is “doctrinally cryptic”). 
 196. Romer, 517 U.S. at 625–26. 
 197. 413 U.S. 528 (1973). 
 198. 473 U.S. 432 (1985). See Robert C. Farrell, Sucessful Rational Basis 
Claims in the Supreme Court from the 1971 Term Through Romer v. Evans, 32 
IND. L. REV. 357, 409–10 (1996) (“[The Romer decision] is clearly consistent 
with, and follows directly from, the Court’s earlier decision in Moreno, which 
the Court cited, and Cleburne, which the Court curiously omitted.”); Kenji 
Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 760 (2011) (dis-
cussing Moreno, Cleburne, and Romer). 
 199. Yoshino, supra note 198 (arguing that a commonality of the Romer, 
Cleburne, and Moreno decisions is discrimination against a particular group). 
In addition to Cleburne, there were additional cases from 1985 in which the 
Court appeared to be applying a heightened rational basis test. See Gayle 
Lynn Pettinga, Note, Rational Basis with Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny by Any 
Other Name, 62 IND. L.J. 779 (1987) (discussing four cases during the 1985 
term). 
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Scalia in dissent,200 some wondered if Bowers could survive the 
equal protection logic of Romer.201 One appellate court went so 
far as to claim, in dicta, “[o]f course Bowers will soon be 
eclipsed in the area of equal protection by the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Romer v. Evans.”202  
Ultimately, Bowers would be overturned, but not based on 
the equal protection theory animating Romer. In Lawrence v. 
Texas, the Court noted that equality of treatment and liberty 
were linked and noted that “[w]hen homosexual conduct is 
made criminal by the law of the State, that declaration in and 
of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to dis-
crimination in both the public and in the private spheres.”203 
The Court, while finding a “tenable argument” that “Romer 
provides the basis for declaring the Texas statute invalid under 
the Equal Protection Clause,” refused to do so on that basis,204 
instead overturning Bowers based on a liberty interest protect-
ed by due process.205  
Romer, though, was key in United States v. Windsor,206 in 
which the Court declared the federal Defense of Marriage Act 
(DOMA) to be unconstitutional. Echoing its description of Colo-
rado’s Amendment 2 as identifying “persons by a single trait 
and then den[ying] them protection across the board,”207 the 
Windsor Court declared that “DOMA writes inequality into the 
entire United States Code.”208 In some ways, Romer and Wind-
sor are analogues to Croson and Adarand. Recall that in 
Croson, the Court found that state and local governments could 
not institute an affirmative action program without having the 
appropriate factual predicate to justify the program and that 
 
 200. Romer, 517 U.S. at 640 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 201. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Challenging the Apartheid of the 
Closet: Establishing Conditions for Lesbian and Gay Intimacy, Nomos, and 
Citizenship, 1961–1981, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 817, 954 n.642 (1997) (suggesting 
“the possibility that Romer provides an occasion to rethink and someday over-
rule Hardwick”); Kevin H. Lewis, Note, Equal Protection in the Wake of Romer 
v. Evans: Implications for the Defense of Marriage Act and Other Laws, 49 
HASTINGS. L.J. 175, 200 (1997) (contending “the Romer decision could be in-
terpreted as overruling Bowers sub silento”). 
 202. Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 458 n.12 (7th Cir. 1996), cited in 
Lewis, supra note 201. 
 203. 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003). 
 204. Id. at 574–75. 
 205. Id. at 564. 
 206. 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695–96 (1996). 
 207. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996). 
 208. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694. 
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state and local government actions in this context were subject 
to strict scrutiny. In Adarand, the Court extended these re-
quirements to the federal government before it can institute an 
affirmative action program. 
Though Windsor was then key to Obergefell,209 there is a 
danger to the development contained in Windsor’s equal protec-
tion analysis: “The very aggressiveness of the Court’s approach 
to the underlying equal protection question appears to exclude 
congressional participation in the same antidiscrimination pro-
ject.”210 In the same way that racial remediation becomes 
equated with racial discrimination and subject to strict scruti-
ny, any remediation efforts on behalf of LGBT persons by any 
governmental entity may be subject to Windsor’s heightened 
examination. Romer/Windsor and Croson/Adarand are ana-
logues potentially in more ways than one.211 
In addition to this potential problem, it is important to 
note that the constitutional path to Lawrence and Obergefell 
was not smooth and direct. Along the way, there were the chal-
lenges to the military’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy212 and 
challenges to private acts of discrimination under state public 
accommodations laws.213 The Court’s approach to these chal-
lenges and how it likely will impact the course of LGBT anti-
discrimination law is set forth below in Part II.D. 
Further, current and anticipated advances in LGBT civil 
rights can be examined against the backdrop of the Court’s fur-
ther retrenchment in race cases. The Court may continue its 
 
 209. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 210. William D. Araiza, After the Tiers: Windsor, Congressional Power to 
Enforce Equal Protection, and the Challenge of Pointillist Constitutionalism, 
94 B.U. L. REV. 367, 400 (2014). Marcy Strauss describes this as the problem 
of symmetry that pervades antidiscrimination law. See Marcy Strauss, 
Reevaluating Suspect Classifications, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 135, 168–70 
(2011). 
 211. This point is developed more fully infra Part II.D. 
 212. For legal challenges post-Lawrence v. Texas, see, for example, Log 
Cabin Republicans v. United States, 658 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2011); Cook v. 
Gates, 528 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2008); Witt v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 527 F.3d 806 
(9th Cir. 2008). 
 213. See, e.g., Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000); Hurley v. 
Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557 (1995). An 
interesting aspect about these two cases is that the private acts of discrimina-
tion were challenged in state courts and the plaintiffs prevailed under the re-
spective state public accommodations laws. The Supreme Court then over-
turned these state supreme court decisions based on expressive First 
Amendment rights of, respectively, Hurley, 515 U.S. at 574–75, and Dale, 530 
U.S. at 644. 
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course of granting formal equality to LGBT persons while sim-
ultaneously undoing civil rights advances that protected racial 
minorities.214 Though there is an internal contradiction, this 
course would serve the legitimation function for the Court be-
cause it gets to reinforce its position in society as a defender of 
civil rights. This course, as well as the advocacy strategy of 
LGBT organizations, would make coalition building between 
the LGBT community and racial minorities more difficult.215 
It is worth noting that Romer v. Evans followed just one 
year after the 1995 trilogy of cases discussed earlier that 
marked the turn to a post-civil rights America. It is also worth 
noting that the major advances for LGBT rights were all au-
thored by Justice Kennedy.216 In 1995, Justice Kennedy au-
thored Miller v. Johnson,217 joined Justice Rehnquist’s majority 
opinion in Missouri v. Jenkins,218 and joined Justice O’Connor’s 
opinion of the Court in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena.219 
Justice Kennedy, the prime mover in advancing the Supreme 
Court’s LGBT antidiscrimination jurisprudence, has typically 
fallen short when it has come to race.220 Freeman might write 
that this is consistent with his point about the legitimation 
function that law serves.221 
 
 214. Cf. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013) (striking down 
portions of the Voting Rights Act); Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 
S. Ct. 2517, 2528 (2013) (requiring a higher standard of proof for Title VII cau-
sation); Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 593 (2009) (allowing defendants to 
avoid disparate-impact liability if failure to take the challenged action would 
have exposed the defendant to disparate-treatment liability). 
 215. See Devon W. Carbado, Black Rights, Gay Rights, Civil Rights, 47 
UCLA L. REV. 1467, 1498–500 (2000) (criticizing the simultaneous invocation 
of race analogies for the discrimination claim with the erasure of blacks in the 
advocacy strategy against “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”); Russell K. Robinson, Mar-
riage Equality and Postracialism, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1010, 1058 (2014) (criticiz-
ing the “like race” arguments behind marriage equality efforts which were ac-
companied by postracialism and an appeal to formal equality that erased 
existing black subordination and undercuts efforts to redress it). This is dis-
cussed more fully infra Part II.D. 
 216. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2591 (2015); United States 
v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2681 (2013); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 561 
(2003); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 621 (1996). 
 217. 515 U.S. 900, 903 (1995). 
 218. 515 U.S. 70, 72 (1995). 
 219. 515 U.S. 200, 203 (1995). 
 220. Cf. Heather K. Gerken, Justice Kennedy and the Domains of Equal 
Protection, 121 HARV. L. REV. 104, 104–05 (2007) (discussing the shift in Jus-
tice Kennedy’s race jurisprudence). 
 221. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination, supra note 22, at 1051. 
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The next three parts examine how LGBT antidiscrimina-
tion law might develop. 
B. TRAJECTORY 1: LGBT DISCRIMINATION IS SEX  
DISCRIMINATION 
Rather than forging its own path, LGBT antidiscrimination 
law might follow sex antidiscrimination law. One commentator 
notes, “According to the sex discrimination argument, when 
states (and private employers) discriminate against gay indi-
viduals, they do so not only because of their sexual orientation 
but also because of their sex.”222 Andrew Koppelman has ad-
vanced this position consistently over the past twenty years.223  
The Court in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, 
Inc.,224 accepted the argument that same-sex sexual harassment 
was actionable as discrimination on the basis of sex under Title 
VII.225 However, Oncale did not extend Title VII protection to 
sexual orientation. Federal circuits, both before and after 
Oncale, appear to agree that Title VII generally does not en-
compass discrimination against someone based on that person’s 
sexual orientation.226 But the fact that harassment is same-sex 
is sufficient to bring this within Title VII. 
 
 222. Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 16, at 1104. 
 223. Andrew Koppelman, Beyond Levels of Scrutiny: Windsor and “Bare 
Desire to Harm,” 64 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1045, 1053 (2014) (“All discrimina-
tion against gay people is sex discrimination for the same reason that discrim-
ination against members of interracial couples is race discrimination.”); An-
drew Koppelman, The Right to Privacy? 2002 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 105, 105 
(opening sentence: “Laws that discriminate against gay people discriminate on 
the basis of sex.”); Koppelman, supra note 178, at 203 (“[D]iscrimination 
against gays is sex discrimination.”). 
 224. 523 U.S. 75 (1998). Oncale’s recognition of sex stereotyping for same-
sex sexual harassment is consistent with the sex stereotyping theory relied 
upon in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). But, as discussed 
infra note 226, protecting against discrimination based on sex-stereotyping is 
very different from protecting more generally against discrimination based on 
sexual orientation.  
 225. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 82. 
 226. Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc. 305 F.3d 1061, 1063 (9th Cir. 2002) 
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Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 261 (3d Cir. 2001) (noting Title 
VII does not prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation); Simonton v. 
Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 36 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[Plaintiff has alleged that he was dis-
criminated against not because he was a man, but because of his sexual orien-
tation. Such a claim remains non-cognizable under Title VII.”); Higgins v. New 
Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999) (“[W]e regard it 
as settled law that, as drafted and authoritatively construed, Title VII does 
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The EEOC and a number of lower courts have found that 
certain LGBT discrimination claims are cognizable under Title 
VII as sex discrimination. For example, an LGBT individual al-
leging sex-stereotyping has a sex discrimination claim under 
Title VII.227 Similarly, discrimination against a person who is 
transgender (gender identity discrimination) is discrimination 
because of sex under Title VII.228 However, the federal circuits 
and the Supreme Court have not extended Oncale and Price 
Waterhouse to discrimination “because of sexual orientation.” 
The result is that some claims that are really at their core ani-
mus based on sexual orientation succeed only if they can be 
shoehorned formalistically into the “because of sex” category. 
“Because of sex” sexual orientation discrimination is necessari-
ly underinclusive. 
As a pragmatic matter, this trajectory is attractive because 
there is already a doctrinal structure in place, though that 
same doctrinal structure creates limitations that have led some 
scholars and advocates to argue for a distinct suspect or quasi-
suspect class. 
C. TRAJECTORY 2: A DISTINCT SUSPECT OR QUASI-SUSPECT  
CLASSIFICATION 
Despite efforts to establish sexual orientation as a suspect 
or quasi-suspect classification, the Supreme Court has thus far 
not based its pro-LGBT decisions on that theory. Litigants have 
not always sought recognition as a suspect or quasi-suspect 
class, quite likely as a matter of litigation strategy. At times, 
the argument has been carried forward by amicus briefs. For 
example, though the respondents in Romer did not argue before 
the U.S. Supreme Court for heightened scrutiny as a suspect or 
quasi-suspect class, some amicus briefs did.229 Similarly, peti-
 
not proscribe harassment simply because of sexual orientation.”); Hopkins v. 
Balt. Gas & Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745, 751–52 (4th Cir. 1996) (“Title VII does not 
prohibit conduct based on the employee’s sexual orientation, whether homo-
sexual, bisexual, or heterosexual. Such conduct is aimed at the employee’s 
sexual orientation and not at the fact that the employee is a man or a wom-
an.”); Williamson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69, 70 (8th Cir. 1989) 
(“Title VII does not prohibit discrimination against homosexuals.”). 
 227. See Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 16, at 1125–32 (discussing Ti-
tle VII cases brought by sexual minorities based on sex-stereotyping). 
 228. See Ilona M. Turner, Comment, Sex Stereotyping Per Se: Transgender 
Employees and Title VII, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 561, 562 (2007). 
 229. See, e.g., Brief for Asian American Legal Defense & Education Fund et 
al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 25–26, Romer v. Evans, 517 
U.S. 620 (1996) (No. 94-1039) (“[S]uch a State constitutional provision [(Colo-
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tioners in Lawrence v. Texas did not argue suspect classifica-
tion. Instead, as in Romer, this argument was made by amici.230  
Perhaps emboldened by Lawrence, as well as the successes 
in advancing marriage equality in the states, respondents and 
the government in Windsor argued that DOMA discriminates 
on the basis of sexual orientation, which triggers heightened 
scrutiny.231 In Obergefell, each of the Briefs for the Petitioners 
whose cases were consolidated on appeal made the argument 
that LGBT persons were a suspect classification.232  
Absent a change in the ideological makeup of the Court, 
the near future likely will not find sexual orientation to be a 
suspect or quasi-suspect classification. In addition, tempting 
though it has been in the face of discrimination to seek suspect 
or quasi-suspect classification, the lessons from race antidis-
crimination law demonstrate the dangers of such “protection.” 
Jane Schacter discusses this more generally as a problem that 
exists with statutory identity categories.233 As with race and 
sex, the category that would receive protection is not a minority 
or subordinated status as LGBT persons; instead, it would be 
the neutral “sexual orientation.”234 Neutral categories, though 
perhaps initially beneficial for the group that suffers discrimi-
 
rado Amendment 2)] makes the group against which it is aimed a suspect 
class, precisely as past formal exclusions from legal protection have made the 
groups at which they were directed suspect or quasi-suspect . . . .”). 
 230. Brief of Human Rights Campaign et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners at 9 n.22, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102) (“In 
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Lesbian & Gay Law Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 14–
28, Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (No. 02-102). 
 231. See Brief for the United States on the Merits Question at 18–22, Unit-
ed States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12-307); Brief on the Merits 
for Respondent Edith Schlain Windsor at 17–19, Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (No. 
12-307). 
 232. Brief for Petitioners at 32–36, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 
(2015) (No. 14-574); Brief for Petitioners at 50–53, Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 
(No. 14-571); Brief for Petitioners at 34–36, 39–44, Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 
(No. 14-562); Brief for Petitioners at 38–40, Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (No. 12-
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 233. Jane S. Schacter, Skepticism, Culture, and the Gay Civil Rights De-
bate in a Post-Civil-Rights Era, 110 HARV. L. REV. 684, 686 (1997) (reviewing 
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nation, lead all too quickly to reverse discrimination claims 
such that the innocent whites in the race remediation context 
are correlative to the innocent heterosexuals in the sexual ori-
entation remediation context. Stated differently, formal equali-
ty only goes so far and is, in some ways, a trap. 
A challenge going forward is to figure out what doctrinal 
tools will best allow discrimination to be challenged and what 
tools will best allow discrimination to be redressed. 
D. TRAJECTORY 3: THE SEXUALITY-BLIND CONSTITUTION, THE  
PUBLIC/PRIVATE DIVIDE, AND THE ACCOMMODATION OF  
RELIGION 
In 1997, Jerome Culp and I predicted, based on Justice 
Kennedy’s invocation of Justice Harlan’s dissent in Plessy v. 
Ferguson,235 that Romer “sets up the architecture of a sexuality-
blind constitutionalism” similar to colorblind constitutional-
ism.236 In a nutshell, colorblind constitutionalism  
draws a public-private distinction employing an ideological structure 
that parallels the classic vision of economic liberty. Under this racial 
public-private distinction, public officials exercising state powers op-
erate according to the rule that race is not to be considered. In the 
private sphere, however, race may be considered.237 
Under this mode of thinking, race remediation by public of-
ficials is racial discrimination. Remember that the “way to stop 
discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on 
the basis of race.”238 The holding in Ricci, though involving pub-
lic officials, likely extends to private employers who must pro-
ceed with extreme caution before engaging in any voluntary 
employment action if intended to avoid a racially disparate out-
come, because that itself becomes a race-conscious decision that 
discriminates on the basis of race. 
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Another key aspect of colorblind constitutionalism is the 
creation of a private sphere within which racial discrimination 
can occur with no legal recourse. Recall that in 1883 in the Civ-
il Rights Cases, the Court rejected Congress’s authority under 
the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to prohibit and 
provide a remedy for acts of private discrimination even though 
they involved the provision of services in the area of public ac-
commodations.239 This did not change until 1964 when, in Heart 
of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States240 and Katzenbach v. 
McClung,241 the Court upheld Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act. The Court re-characterized what it had previously taken to 
be merely private acts of discrimination as sufficiently public 
because they involved public accommodations involving inter-
state commerce.242  
Absent changes to federal civil rights laws, most private 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation will remain 
beyond legal redress. This has been the case even in certain in-
stances when state laws have been found to protect against dis-
crimination against LGBT persons. Hurley v. Irish-American 
Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc.243 and Boy 
Scouts of America v. Dale244 present stark examples of this phe-
nomenon. In Hurley, the Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bi-
sexual Group of Boston (GLIB) applied to march in the 1992 St. 
Patrick’s Day Parade in South Boston.245 The parade’s organiz-
ers, the South Boston Allied War Veterans Council (Council), 
rejected the application, but GLIB obtained a court order per-
mitting their participation and marched in that year’s pa-
rade.246 The next year, GLIB applied and was again rejected by 
the Council.247 GLIB sued in state court alleging violations of 
the Massachusetts and U.S. Constitutions as well as Massa-
chusetts public accommodations law.248 The trial court rejected 
 
 239. See supra text accompanying notes 54–60.  
 240. 379 U.S. 241 (1964). 
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the Council’s First Amendment argument and found that the 
denial of the application was based on sexual orientation dis-
crimination in violation of Massachusetts’ public accommoda-
tions law.249 The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts af-
firmed.250 The Supreme Court, in overturning the Massachu-
Massachusetts court, described the conflict not as a right to be 
free from sexual orientation discrimination but instead as com-
pelled access speech, whereby GLIB was seen as trying to use 
state public accommodations law in order to compel access to 
the parade in a way that infringed upon the expressive First 
Amendment rights of the parade organizers.251 
In Boy Scouts of America, expressive First Amendment 
rights provided the constitutional rationale to override New 
Jersey public accommodations law as interpreted and applied 
by the New Jersey courts.252 James Dale achieved the rank of 
Eagle Scout and was an adult member of the Boy Scouts of 
America and an assistant scoutmaster when the Boy Scouts 
learned that Dale “is an avowed homosexual and gay rights ac-
tivist” and revoked his membership.253 The New Jersey Su-
preme Court determined that the Boy Scouts was a place of 
public accommodation and that the Boy Scouts violated New 
Jersey public accommodations law when it revoked Dale’s 
membership based on his homosexuality.254 The opening rule 
statements in Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion focused on 
the First Amendment’s right to freedom of association. The 
opinion held that freedom of association “presupposes a free-
dom not to associate”255 and “[t]he forced inclusion of an un-
wanted person in a group infringes the group’s freedom of ex-
pressive association if the presence of that person affects in a 
significant way the group’s ability to advocate public or private 
viewpoints.”256 The Court went on to emphasize that the Boy 
Scouts is a private, nonprofit organization and that Dale’s 
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forced inclusion would significantly burden the Boy Scouts’ ex-
pressive desire not to promote homosexuality.257 
In Hurley and Boy Scouts of America, the Court draws 
careful distinctions between what constitutes public as opposed 
to private discrimination. Private acts of discrimination cannot 
be overridden by state public accommodations laws because of 
the First Amendment’s expressive rights of association. State 
public accommodations laws cannot be used to compel access of 
unwanted messages or forced inclusion of unwanted individu-
als. 
The accommodation of private discrimination gains added 
constitutional impetus when it is mixed with the accommoda-
tion of religion.258 In an ongoing set of cases in Washington 
state,259 in which a flower shop, Arlene’s Flowers, refused to sell 
flowers to a same-sex couple for their wedding, what will the 
interplay be between the First Amendment, the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act, and Washington state constitution 
and statutes?260 Will Arlene’s Flowers follow a course similar to 
Hurley and Boy Scouts of America? Though there are state ana-
logues that protect the right to make and enforce contracts free 
from discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, 42 
U.S.C. § 1981 only protects against race discrimination. 
Though formal equality has been granted in the sphere of 
marriage, it seems that federal LGBT antidiscrimination law 
will be stunted absent amendments to many of our federal civil 
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rights laws. Without such amendments, we will likely be left 
with Herbert Wechsler’s neutral principals261 where courts fear 
to promote one person’s associational rights over another. Re-
call the language from Hurley and Boy Scouts of America—the 
apparatus of state power through the courts cannot be used to 
compel access or force inclusion that contravenes a private par-
ty’s expressive First Amendment rights.262 Though jurispruden-
tially located within speech rights, at the heart of those opin-
ions is the protection of a private party’s free association rights. 
What the Hurley and Boy Scouts of America Court ignores is 
that in deciding to not compel access or force inclusion, it is us-
ing the power of the state through its courts to empower pri-
vate parties to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation. 
The Court becomes not quite a neutral participant in discrimi-
nation on the basis of sexual orientation. It legitimizes sexual 
orientation discrimination. Even if federal civil rights laws are 
amended to include certain protections against sexual orienta-
tion discrimination, the doctrinal architecture already exists 
with Hurley and Boy Scouts of America (and Hobby Lobby)263 
and can be borrowed from race antidiscrimination law where 
formal equality is achieved yet discrimination and inequality 
persist. 
III.  IF ALAN FREEMAN IS RIGHT, WHAT OUGHT WE TO 
DO?   
Freeman’s hypothesis is admittedly “descriptive and ex-
planatory, not prescriptive or normative.”264 If he is correct with 
regard to his characterization of federal race antidiscrimination 
law, and if his hypothesis extends to predict the course of fed-
eral LGBT antidiscrimination law, that it will ultimately serve 
to legitimate discrimination against LGBT persons, what ought 
we to do? In Antidiscrimination Law, Freeman states, “If the 
federal courts are to become, as they were in the past, little 
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more than reactionary apologists for the existing order, we 
should treat them with the contempt they deserve.”265 
Branding the federal courts and judges monolithically as 
reactionary apologists is probably overstated. After all, when 
the Supreme Court overturns a lower court as part of its project 
of legitimizing racial discrimination, it is, after all, overturning 
a lower court whose decision presumably might help ameliorate 
racial discrimination. One might turn this around, though, and 
describe the enterprise as an elaborate charade, with partici-
pants being willingly or unwillingly co-opted. From this, one 
might surmise that it is naïve to put our faith in constitutional-
ized rights and that we ought to abandon the federal courts. 
In some ways, this reprises the conversation between Criti-
cal Legal Studies (CLS) and Critical Race Theory (CRT) about 
rights discourse. On the one hand, the CLS critique of rights 
discourse and the radical indeterminacy of rights was taken by 
some to mean that we ought to abandon the pursuit of rights.266 
This prompted CRT critiques of the CLS critique.267 In one at-
tempt to move past the debate, Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw 
noted, “The fundamental problem is that, although [CLS] Crit-
ics criticize law because it functions to legitimate existing insti-
tutional arrangements, it is precisely this legitimating function 
that has made law receptive to certain demands in this area.”268 
We might describe the moment that we find ourselves in, 
following Lawrence, Windsor, and Obergefell, as one in which 
the legitimating function is precisely what advocates have been 
able to deploy successfully. But we should be mindful of the 
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CLS critique of rights and what Freeman criticizes as the fail-
ures of race antidiscrimination law. 
But in moving forward, Crenshaw makes clear that co-
optation is a real danger269 and accepts at least part of the CLS 
critique, warning that the civil rights community “must come to 
terms with the fact that antidiscrimination discourse is funda-
mentally ambiguous and can accommodate conservative as well 
as liberal views of race and equality.”270 She concludes by say-
ing that “[f]or Blacks, the task at hand is to devise ways to 
wage ideological and political struggle while minimizing the 
costs of engaging in an inherently legitimating discourse.”271 
Though there are dangers in comparing the histories and chal-
lenges of differently situated groups,272 I would suggest the 
same for advocates seeking to advance LGBT equality. In some 
ways, advocates for LGBT equality are already working to do 
this. And those seeking racial and LGBT equality cannot aban-
don the federal courts. 
Freeman, after his corrosive characterization of the federal 
courts, states simply and unsatisfactorily, “One can only hope 
that other political institutions will be reinvigorated.”273 While I 
agree that activity should be redirected, including to other po-
litical institutions, I would suggest that activity be redirected 
toward developing state antidiscrimination law and jurispru-
dence. While not abandoning efforts to reform federal antidis-
crimination law, we should be mindful and pragmatic to direct 
our efforts to reform what we can. This was already being done 
in the political and legal struggle for marriage equality.274 But 
that approach tended to focus on a single issue, and national 
advocacy organizations tended to view it as a state-by-state 
campaign, moving on to the next state(s) when achieving suc-
cess in one.275  
What I suggest is a little different and in some ways is less 
satisfying because states have vastly different antidiscrimina-
tion laws and jurisprudence, with some states amenable to 
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change, with others, not.276 The already existing patchwork of 
differential inequality will become intensified. But better this 
than to do nothing or waste one’s efforts. 
In addition, changes at the state level can lead to changes 
at the federal level. The Court’s Eighth Amendment jurispru-
dence and the Court’s inquiry into “our society’s evolving 
standards of decency” to help determine what constitutes cruel 
and unusual punishment is instructive.277 For example, in Rop-
er v. Simmons, the Court commented on its earlier decision, At-
kins v. Virginia, which declared the death penalty for the men-
tally retarded unconstitutional. The Court considered objective 
indicia in the form of legislative enactments and state practice 
to conclude that there was a national consensus against execut-
ing the mentally retarded.278 Similarly, it found in Roper objec-
tive indicia—“the rejection of the juvenile death penalty in the 
majority of States; the infrequency of its use even where it re-
mains on the books; and the consistency in the trend toward 
abolition of the practice”—sufficient to conclude “that today our 
society views juveniles . . . as ‘categorically less culpable than 
the average criminal.’”279 Reforms that occur at the state level 
can become federalized. 
There was a time during the civil rights struggle when the 
federal courts were crucial to overcome the recalcitrance of 
state institutions. To the extent that the federal system is re-
calcitrant or resistant to justice for marginalized groups and 
individuals, the terrain shifts with state institutions (courts, 
legislatures, administrative agencies, executives) becoming im-
portant as places to advance civil rights.280 
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After Shelby County v. Holder, efforts could be made in 
Congress to revive the unconstitutional portions of the Voting 
Rights Act by developing current data rather than relying on, 
as the Shelby Court described, “decades-old data relevant to 
decades-old problems.”281 But while those efforts are underway, 
and even alongside them, efforts could be made at the state 
level. The California Voting Rights Act of 2001 (CVRA),282 writ-
ten by Joaquin Avila,283 presents an example of a state voting 
rights act that supplements, and in some ways improves, on the 
federal VRA.284 Efforts have been underway during the last 
three legislative sessions in Washington to pass a Washington 
Voting Rights Act (WVRA).285 Each time, the bill has progressed 
further in the legislative process.286 In addition to working to 
pass the WVRA, the CVRA and proposed WVRA offer models 
for other states. Though it is likely that these efforts would de-
velop only a patchwork of state VRAs, it would advance voting 
rights in those states and might lead to a greater appetite to 
revive and improve the federal VRA.  
One barrier within law schools is that there is too much 
emphasis in the law school curriculum and in the legal acade-
my on the federal courts and the federal system, with insuffi-
cient attention paid to states. We forget sometimes that this is 
a discursive process, state to federal, federal to state, and back 
again.287  
The call to utilize the states as laboratories, and to achieve 
justice where and when you can, brings up the point that there 
is nothing inherently wrong with incrementalism as part of a 
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political and legal advocacy strategy. This ought to be clear 
from the NAACP litigation strategy to overturn Plessy v. Fer-
guson,288 and it ought to be clear from the marriage equality 
legislative and litigation strategy.289 
A tough lesson in doing this work is that sometimes, by los-
ing, you win.290 The toughest lesson, though, is that sometimes, 
you just lose. 
  CONCLUSION   
On the wall in my office at work, I have a post-it that says, 
“the limits of antidiscrimination law.” Every day, I look at it 
and I think about how we might be able to overcome those lim-
its. Most days, I just butt my head against that wall (and the 
limits of antidiscrimination law). I imagine a conversation that 
I might have with Alan Freeman if he were alive. I imagine 
that he would call me an idiot or a fool, or both. But I also im-
agine that he might laud our efforts at the Korematsu Center 
for Law and Equality. There is something that can be admired 
about tilting at windmills. 
In thinking about this Article’s title and whether LGBT 
antidiscrimination law will follow the course of race antidis-
crimination law, though the course of race antidiscrimination 
law ought not to give one a lot of hope, the course of race anti-
discrimination law is not yet completed. Many of us are work-
ing to shift the course of race antidiscrimination law, in theory 
and in practice. It is likely that LGBT antidiscrimination law 
will develop in fits and starts, sometimes one step forward and 
two steps back. Though the march toward progress is not inevi-
table, there is no predetermined course for LGBT antidiscrimi-
nation law. Instead, it remains for us to write/right the course. 
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